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1.1 The JCS Budget Relationship 10
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Security Act of 1947 states: "The Joint
Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisors to the
President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of
Defense." [Ref. 1: p. 19]
These words carry with them significant weight and
responsiblity . They specifically designate the JCS as the
principle military experts of the nation, directing them to
advise the nation's current administration on our national
security. These words may have possibly lost some of their
meaning over the strenuous years of the life of the JCS.
However, they still today carry all of the weight of law;
and, the JCS f responsibility to perform their legally
mandated duties should carry as much weight now as when
these words were first placed into law. Certainly the
problems of providing national defense have only grown more
complex. The Reagan administration's recent defense
spending increases have further underlined the role of JCS
as providers of expert advice. Indeed, the JCS
responsibility to advise on budget policy may be as
important as its responsibility to advise on the policies of
strategic nuclear warfare. This thesis will focus on the
JCS, using the budget process as a lens to examine recent
criticisms of the organization.
The budget process within the Department of Defense has
long been a subject of debate, particularly disagreement,
among its students. The question of JCS influence over the
DOD budget has also been a question long studied and
evaluated. Since their creation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
have had an institutional association with the DOD budget
process. The chart in Figure 1.1 depicts this association.
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Figure 1.1 The JCS Budget Relationship
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of the JCS in the budget process. The chart indicates the
Joint Chiefs interact most significantly with other DOD
agencies in the budget area through the Joint Strategic
Planning Document ( JSPD) , and the Joint Program Assessment
Memorandum ( JPAM) . Through these documents, the Joint
Chiefs frame the discussion which shapes the budget.
Some, however, believe their actual impact on budget
development and execution has been negligible. [Ref. 2: p.
131] It has been considered negligible in the sense that the
opinions of the nation's greatest military minds are often
disregarded by both SECDEF and Congress. Budget
recommendations have not been adopted as submitted. In many
cases they have been disregarded due to the organization's
inadequacies in creating a budget product which is unusable
due to apparent "non- consensus" of opinion on resource
allocation, and "over-consensus" on budget levels. 1
Recommendations on budget issues suffer from
over-passification of the interests of all the Services.
Total agreement is sought prior to forwarding
recommendations up the chain of command. The value of joint
argument and debate is often lost. The fundamental problems
creating this situation are structural. [Ref. 3: p. 268]
Why does the JCS organization require change? Why has
so much time and energy been devoted to debate over
developing a more effective JCS military advisory group?
The answer to these questions possibly lies in the
complexities of the organization. These complexities are
generally easily identified.
There are two major objections to the present
organizational system under which the JCS labors. The first
is the quality of the output produced by the JCS. The
'Non-consensus from non-agreement on which programs are
worthwhile, and over- consensus from all members agreeing
that each service should get the budget level they request,
as opposed to joint recommendations on what is needed.
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second is the institutional behavior of the JCS members
resulting from its current structure. [Ref. 4: p. 534] They
pose extremely difficult problems in arriving at a workable
solution.
In an article on The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
,
John G. Kester states that these two structurally-based
problems stem from one single source,
"the division of the U.S. armed forces into four
services in three military departments, and the
consequent centrifugal pressures that division
Generates. Any institutional alteration which enhances
he influence of the supraservice JCS will almost ipso
facto threaten the interests of the individual services,
and is likely to be resisted for that reason." [Ref. 5:
p. 534]
According to the writers of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) paper (expressing an opinion
shared by many throughout the defense academic and
professional community), even the best-structured
organization cannot work effectively with unqualified
people. But the converse is also true: outdated or
cumbersome organizations and procedures will handicap even
the most outstanding and dedicated individuals. [Ref. 6: p.
10] The structurally unsound design of the JCS organization
prevents even the most astute bureaucrat from functioning
effectively within the organization, and prevents the
organization from being effective in its role relative to
the DOD budget. These difficulties are not the result of
insufficient management skills, but from the power struggle
between the influences of jointness and the influences of
the service. [Ref. 7: p. 537]
Historically the JCS has been ineffective in influencing
the budgeting process for three major reasons:
1. Rivalries between the chiefs have been exploited by
OSD - split decisions on budgeting issues among the
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chiefs gives OSD more freedom in promoting its own
?roposals , and dealing with unsettled issues in ways
hat would displease every service. [Ref. 8: p. 63]
Budget policy development has not involved the JCS -
the use or arbitrary numbers by administration
officials in designating budget levels has been
completely without any JCS input. These numbers have
lacked any reasonable justification for their use by
the administration. [Ref. 9: p. 129]
The JCS has had to balance their concern for their
parent service with their concern for the national
interest - they have had to maintain their service's
confidence by promoting programs and policies which
rere financially acceptable to their service.
Ref. 10: p. 49] At the same time they have had to
maintain a global view and support national interests,
at times at the expense of their respective services.
These decisions, to support national interests which
were contrary to their service interests, cost several
chiefs a great deal of influence and respect within
their own service. This reduced further their
effectiveness individually, and as a group. in
influencing the budget process. [Ref. 11: p. 61]
In the past, the JCS has been accused of being fiscally
irresponsible. [Ref. 12: p. 269] What has actually occurred
is the JCS has been required to conform with national policy
which is itself fiscally irresponsible. [Ref. 13: p. 73]
The enormity of U.S. world wide defense commitments by
definition prevents funding of these commitments within the
scope of the current budget. There are too many
commitments, and too few dollars. Hence, the Joint Chiefs
and the Services must deal with this dilemma. They do not
set national priorities, and funding levels. They must,
however, work with these disproportionate requirements.
It is illogical to require the JCS to interpret the
requirements of national objectives accurately and at the
same time restrict them by stipulating budget levels to
which they must conform. The JCS under the current system
finds itself in a "Catch-22" situation. If they accurately
interpret requirements to attain current national
objectives, the budget will be so large (in order to support
these requirements) that Congress will not fund it. If they




A military organization, such as the JCS, which
represents the finest military minds the nation can produce,
would normally be expected to influence the development of
such an important document as the budget as one of their
primary institutional duties. 2 Not just the "comment and
discussion" of the budget which makes up the majority of the
JCS budget input, but involvement in the actual draft of the
President's Budget would appear to be logically implied.
[Ref. 14: p. 129] However, this has not been the case since
the JCS was first organized.
The CSIS proposal for reorganization of the JCS
,
and
its potential to make substantial changes in the
organization's ability to be influential in the DOD budget,
is the subject of this paper. It should be noted that
greater budget influence/participation was not necessarily
the major focus of the CSIS proposal. It is acknowledged
that there are several proposals which are not
budget-related. There are organizational and structural
issues proposed which may, however, have side effects
resulting in more effective budget influence by the JCS.
The intent of this paper is to study these proposals to
determine their individual or collective ability to enhance
JCS influence on the DOD budget ultimately submitted as the
President's budget, as well as the final budget resolution
approved by Congress.
A large number of the issues raised in the CSIS study
are not new. They have been at the origin of academic and
2 Influence requires more than just the submission of
last year's budget plus some amount of growth (or non-growth
in the case of the FY86 budget). Influence should range
from severe cuts in defense spending for unneeded defense
programs, to substantial increased expenditures to meet
increased national objectives. The point being, if JCS, in
its most qualified opinion, determines a cut or an increase
in the budget is required, that opinion should carry the
overwhelming majority of influence on insuring that budget
is approved.
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professional debate for decades. The debate over
reorganization is likewise not new. Its application to
current, issues, however, is apparent in light of . the
recently published report on defense reorganization, by the
staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). On
October 16, 1985, the SASC staff report was released by
Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn. 3 [Ref. 15: p. 3] This
report also deals with a wide spectrum of reforms within
DOD, again, not specifically focussing on the budget issue.
However, there are several recommendations which parallel
(although are not identical to) the CSIS report. The fact
that this report is published at this time, and after a two
year study effort, retains the reorganization debate as one
which is as timely now as it has been over the past thirty
years. It is a subject whose current application has always
been present, and whose application will continue until the
"right" defense organization is established.
Chapter two introduces a discussion of some
peculiarities about the JCS organization which are germane
to understanding its operation and some of the difficulties
faced by those who are a part of the organization. Chapter
three will focus on the position of the Chairman - Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the arguments focussing on the
strengthening of his role as an advisor to SECDEF the
National Security Council, and the President. Chapter four
explores the organization of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and its ability to effectively interact with the
JCS. In Chapter five, discussion concentrates on the
interaction between Congress and JCS, and the issues
focussing on the biennial budget. Chapter six discusses
proposals intended to strengthen the DOD develpment and
acquisition process. Chapter seven addresses the present
and potential role of the Strategic Plans and Resource
3 GPO Document Number S. PRT . 99-86
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Analysis Agency (SPRAA). This chapter develops its data
resources from personal interviews conducted by this writer
in Washington, D.C., during the period 9-12 September, 1985.
These interviews were conducted with members of the JCS
organization, the Department of the Navy, the National
Security Council, as well as individual staff members
associated with Senate Committees. Approximately thirteen
interviews were conducted, and contributed to the
development of information included in this chapter.
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II. THE ORGANIZATIONAL MAZE
A. WHAT THE JCS DOES BY LAW
No study of the JCS organization would be worthwhile
without first understanding how the organization works. The
current organization was established by the National
Security Act of 1947. It was amended in 1948, and again in
1949 when the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff was created. [Ref . 16] The organization was then
amended by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. This act
brought about five significant changes.
1. It increased the authorized size of the Joint Staff
from 210 to 400 officers;
2. It repealed a law that provided that the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have no vote;
3. It organized the unified and specified commands,
separating them from the military departments, making
their chain of command direct to SECDEF through the
JCS;
4. It gave operational control of all combat-ready forces
to the unified and specified commands;
5. It eliminated the provision in the act that the
Military Departments would be administered by their
own Secretaries, and gave direct organizational, and
operational direction of the services to the Secretary
of Defense. [Ref. 17: p. 957]
The organizational structure has remained essentially
unchanged since that time. [Ref. 18: p. 3]
The United States Code Annotated - Title 10 (Armed
Forces), Section 141 delineates, by article, those
responsibilities the JCS is tasked to carry out:
" a. Subject to the authority and direction of
the President and the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff shall--
(1) prepare strategic plans and provide
' for the strategic direction of the Armed
Forces
;
(2) prepare joint logistic plans and as-
sign logistic responsibilities to the Armed
Forces in accordance with those plans;
(3) establish unified commands in strategic
areas
•
(4) review the major material and personnel
requirements of the Armed Forces in accordance
with strategic and logistic plans;
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(5) formulate policies for the joint
training of the Armed Forces;
(6) formulate policies for coordinating the
military education of members of the Armed
Forces
;
(7) provide for representation of the
United States on the Military Staff Com-
mittee of the United Nations in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations; and
(8) perform such other duties as the Presi-
dent or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
b. After first informing the Secretary of De-
fense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may
make such recommendations to Congress relating to
the Department of Defense as he may consider
appropriate
.
All functions in the Department of Defense and its
component agencies are performed under the direction,
authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense and the
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the four
military departments, the seven unified and specified
commands, and five Defense agencies designated by the
Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 19: p. 5] The Joint Chiefs are
supported by the Joint Staff. The joint staff is currently
managed by the Director of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The Director receives tasking from both the Chairman
and the Service Chiefs. This has been the cause of much
difficulty in the past, as would be expected. It has always
been difficult to work for two bosses (five bosses in this
case)
.
There are three basic characteristics of the JCS system
which must be recognized to understand and evaluate this
organization. [Ref. 20: p. 12] These characteristics are
derived from the tasking of the JCS in the National Security
Act.
1. It is a committee system;
2. It is a coordinating system;
3. It is an advisory, not a decision making system.
*
"Note: This third characteristic can be misleading. The
JCS obviously makes decisions concerning recommendations to
SECDEF, NSC etc. However, these are
decisions/recommendations in an advisory role.
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The JCS is a committee of services. They must rely upon
compromise in order to perform their assigned missions. The
committee system exacerbates the problems of compromise.
The compromises the committee seeks are generally not of
joint compromise, but of self -protecting compromise to
prevent loss of one's own programs. This problem is at the
heart of the JCS dilemma. [Ref. 21: p. 12] As stated in the
Blue Ribbon Report,
So long as the JCS remains a committee system, it will
invariably operate on a basis of negotiated compromise,
especially in matters where Service interests are at
stake. Unless the committee system is changed, this
fact of life should be accepted and ways sought to work
around it or to mitigate those of its effects which are
pernicious." [Ref. 22: p. 3]
The JCS coordinates the debate of issues effecting
national security, as well as the joint training
requirements of the services. These issues may be acted on
by the Joint Chiefs, or by the joint staff, depending upon
the significance of the issue.
The third characteristic is one which has seemingly been
taken for granted. The JCS is to advise those in authority
above them on issues involving national security. This
advice encompasses force levels, strategic planning, as well
as resource allocation and fiscal planning. In a pure
sense, this is the bread and butter of their existence.
B. THE PAPER CHASE
When first considering the JCS, it would appear that no
one, no matter how adept at bureaucratic processes, could
possibly follow the stops, loopholes, floor traps and green
flimsy purple buffs that are a part of the normal flow
process of the JCS paper work organization. All
organizations run on paper, and the JCS is no exception.
The flow of paper through the JCS organization has long
been one of the major faults of the system. When the CSIS
19
study was published, the paper work process within JCS was
well known and highly criticized. It has since been
changed. Historically, the paper process was slow and
produced a watered-down product. This familiar paper flow
is described in the following paragraphs. Although changed,
some of its elements remain in the present system (discussed
in the latter part of this section) . The following
paragraphs describe the system as it worked in the past.
The people who perform the primary work for the joint
staff are Action Officers (AO's). Policy issue papers are
prepared by them. They insure that the issue papers are
sent through the paper mill stages beginning with the first
draft or "buff". The buff becomes a "flimsy" as it
progresses up through the review process and will become a
"green" after several revisions. If there is a major
objection to the paper, by any service, the green becomes a
"purple", and eventually ends up as a "red stripe"
memorandum which is presented to the secretary of defense.
[Ref. 23: p. 28]
The AO's of the Joint Staff spend countless hours
pushing these issue papers through the system. This process
requires a great deal of overtime and weekend work.
[Ref. 24: p. 35] The majority of the overtime stems from
staffing the flimsies and buffs from staff office to staff
office and the various subdivisions. Sitting and waiting
for comments until midnight on week nights, or until noon on
Sundays is not uncommon. This time expenditure results from
each service attempting to protect their own interests as
the paper approaches final resolution. [Ref. 25: p. 35]
Action officers and service planners all attempt to
reduce controversy during this process by developing wording
in the paper which is acceptable to other staff members.
This process leads to the unfortunate situation of many
issues, which should be resolved at the working level,
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being, instead, diluted more and more the farther up the
organization it proceeds. This not only prevents rapid
resolution of issues, but it intensifies the diluted product
finally presented to the JCS members to act on. [Ref. 26:
p. 13]
This paper maze allows each service to comment on an
issue paper at each stage of its routing. This creates an
enormous time requirement in sending an issue from its
inception (first draft) to the time it is actually presented
to the JCS. Although there are still a great number of
issues handled and agreed upon by the joint staff, 5 on
issues which are of major significance to the country,
requiring JCS decision/recommendation, the process is
extremely time consuming. [Ref. 27: p. 17]
What is not obvious in this process, is the method by
which an issue paper is actually processed. The AO will
write the draft and present it to all of the services. If
all are not in complete agreement with its wording, the AO
takes the paper, and rewrites it until all Services do
agree. This iterative process can occur more than once.
Once agreement is reached at the AO level, the AO then
presents it to the program director (usually an 0-6). If
the 0-6 does not approve of its wording, the process starts
all over again. [Ref. 28] At each level, all of the
Services get an opportunity to word-smith the paper. This
process is the harbinger of "oatmeally" watered-down wording
which looks like a paper that tip-toes through the issues,
as opposed to a reflection of strong substantive agreement
or debate.
5 The Blue Ribbon Panel concluded that approximately 12.5
percent of the issues considered by the JCS organization
were addressed by the Joint Chiefs; the rest being decided
on by the lower echelons within the organization.
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For years, this process has been the hallmark of
non-decision and has spawned harsh criticism of the JCS
organization. This process, however, no longer exists in
this form. Memorandum of Procedures- 132 (MOP- 132) approved
in July 1985, now directs that papers will be pushed through
the paper process as written by the Action Officer.
[Ref. 29] Action Officers will still assemble the AO ' s from
the various Services and discuss the issue prior to writing
his first draft. Now, however, when the first draft is
submitted to the 0-6, he will have two options. If he
agrees with the paper, he approves it. If he does not, he
does not require it to be rewritten. Instead, he now
attaches a dissenting view to the paper and forwards it on
to the next individual. All of the Services may now attach
a dissenting view and then bump it on up the Chain of
Command. [Ref. 30]
This process now records the debate on the issue as
opposed to writing a paper which presents no debate. The
dissenting views are now available to the various echelons
of review, resulting in a more clear understanding of the
issues involved, and a more worthwhile discussion.
Additionally, the time requirements for processing a paper
are significantly reduced. Although there is no guarantee
that all papers submitted will be totally free of the
problems in the old system, the potential for those same
problems is far reduced, if not almost totally eliminated.
C. HOW ONE GETS ASSIGNED AS A JCS MEMBER
The question of preparation of a JCS member for a JCS
assignment arises with good reason. An individual assigned
a position of great responsibility, would normally be
expected to be well versed in the environment in which he
will be assigned. It would be expected that SECDEF would
see great value and certainly promote the idea of a JCS
member having significant background and personal experience
22
in the JCS organization. It would likewise appear logical
that one if not two tours of assignment within the
organization would be a prerequisite to assignment as a
Service Chief.
In the case of the Joint Chiefs, however, this policy
has not been followed. The four services do not prepare
officers to assume the responsibilities they will face as a
JCS member. [Ref. 31: p. 9] It is interesting to note,
however, that the National Security Act specifically states
that SECDEF, for his own staff, will insure that officers
assigned to him will be assured that their assignment to the
agencies of the Secretary of Defense may afford an
opportunity of important advancement in their careers . It
specifically directs the Service Secretaries to insure that
selection boards weight equally, assignments within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense with those of assignment
in the military Service staff. There is no such specific
provision in "looking out for" the officers serving with the
JCS. [Ref. 32: pp. 52-53]
Quoting General David C. Jones (CJCS 1978-1982),
"In my view, the basic causes of our most serious
deficiencies can be divided into two categories
:
personnel and organization . . . There is inadequate
cross-service and joint experience in our military, from
the top down. The incentives and rewards for seeking
such experience are virtually non-existent. And the
problem is compounded by the high degree of turbulence
in key positions." [Ref. 33: p. 9]
There are some inherent problems, however, in the system
which makes it even more difficult for the services to
cultivate individuals for future assignment to the JCS
organization. These limitations are a direct result of the
National Security Act of 1947. The act not only limits the
number of officers that can make up the joint staff at any
one time, it also provides limits on the frequency of
rotation in reassigning an individual to the joint staff
after having finished a tour of duty there.
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Specifically, the NSA restricts the tour of duty for
joint staff members to three years. Having completed a tour
there, an officer may not be reassigned to the joint staff
until having completed at least a three year tour elsewhere.
[Ref. 34: p. 20] There is a provision that a limited number
of officers (30) may be reassigned to the joint staff within
the three year time frame. However, this number must be
divided between the four services, limiting them to
essentially seven officers who can maintain the "corporate
knowledge" of the joint staff's work. This in effect
prevents all services from developing officers who will have
significant expertise in the joint arena. Officers can
always be assigned to other joint staffs (such as CINCEUR)
,
and continue their joint development. However, this is
still a less desirable alternative than continued JCS
experience
.
The Blue Ribbon Report points out that the JCS
organization does not posess personnel with continuous
memory of past operations (beyond the last three years) as
do most civilian organizations. This lack of corporate
memory cannot be replaced by historical records . The
operational pace of the joint staff arena will not permit
it. [Ref. 35: p. 35] The JCS, therefore, again has its
hands tied by the law which created it.
One of the major recommendations of the October 1985
SASC staff report is for the establishment, within each
Service, of a joint duty career specialty. [Ref. 36: p. 47]
This would, for the first time, provide for career
preparation within the joint field, by officers in each
Service. Presently, some Services (such as the Army) are
more prone to send individuals to joint tours and nurture
development in this area than others (although this
development is still considerably below what would be
desirable). The SASC staff report provides for making this
24
a separate career specialty which an individual could
prepare for and be promotable in.
The legal restrictions on assignment to the- joint staff
are only a part of the problem. The perception of those
assigned to the joint staff, as well as those not assigned
to it, is that it is a tour that should be avoided if
possible. The potential career disabilities which could
result from such a tour are too great to encourage second
assignments. Most will do anything possible to prevent
their assignment to the joint staff, and will avoid, at all
costs, a second tour. This feeling is not one felt only by
the lower echelon officers, but expressed by senior officers
from Brigadier Generals up. [Ref. 37: p. 36]
Career disabilities are perceived from "not staying
within the normal career pattern" (which does not include a
joint staff tour in any service). In addition, the
potential for falling out of favor with your service over
political issues is too great to warrant the risk.
D. WHAT IT ALL MEANS
The JCS, then, is faced with restrictions in its legal
charter, the problems associated with a decision-making
process involving a committee system, and a lack of
experience in joint staffs by the JCS member.
The structure of the organization is not only
cumbersome, it promotes undesirable issues of service
loyalty by its design. This issue will continue to be
discussed in more detail later. But, it should be clear at
this point, that the JCS organization encourages
protectionism of service views, as opposed to promoting
healthy joint discussion/decision/recommendation.
A word of caution before proceeding with the proposals.
Inherent in the CSIS proposal, is the requirement to view
the proposals as a whole rather than piecemeal. Just as a
new engineering technology to produce widgets may require
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several parts moving in synchronization with each other, so
do these proposals suggest a new approach to the JCS
organization through the unified interaction of these
changes. The reader should, however, approach the proposals
both individually and collectively. The effects of the
proposals collectively should be judged for possible loss
through combined interaction, or resultant synergy from
cooperating components.
26
III. JOINT MILITARY STRUCTURES
A. OVERVIEW
Throughout the life of the JCS, the joint military-
structure has received a great deal of study from within the
military establishment, as well as from those outside the
walls of the Pentagon. There has been an enormous amount of
rhetoric which supports significant organizational change
beginning with the Chairman (CJCS) himself. It is hard to
conceive that a change in just one aspect of the joint
structure (strengthening the CJCS position) could bring
relief to the multitude of problems the organization faces.
This one aspect, however, has received more debate than
any other single issue this writer has observed. As will be
seen, it will likewise receive the major emphasis in this
chapter. The enormity of the debate itself establishes the
CJCS as the keyholder for perception of the organization
from the outside, as well as functioning, or lack of, within
the organization.
The CSIS proposal states their opinion for changing the
joint structure as follows:
"In our view, " there are compelling reasons to develop
stronger joint military organizations capable of acting
from a cross-service perspective to integrate the
special requirements of air, land, sea, and space
operations. This strengthened joint military structure
would have three primary functions: (1) to provide
cross- service military advice to civilian leaders, (2)
to develop strategic plans that link military
capabilities to national objectives, and (3) to plan and
conduct combined-arms military operations. Currentjoint structures do not lend themselves to the effective
execution of any of these crucial functions."
B. PROPOSAL 1: A SINGLE MILITARY ADVISOR
The first proposal in this area of joint military
structures, suggested by the CSIS study, focuses directly on
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the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CSIS study
recommends his role be modified to achieve greater joint
perspectives as follows:
"The National Security Act (NSA) should be amended to
designate the Chairman as the principal military adviser
to the President, the secretary of defense and the
National Security Council, replacing the corporate JCS
in that role. The Chairman must also be given the staff
support necessary to carry out that role effectively.
Service Chiefs should continue to provide advice to the
Chairman and Service Secretaries on all issues, and to
the Secretary of Defense and the President on issues of
crucial importance, but the Chairman should have a
unique position as the individual who presents the
integrated professional military perspective on all
questions
.
Four specific changes are recommended:
1. Establish the role of the Chairman-JCS as the
principal military advisor: the intent is to ensure
civilian leaders have an additional military
perspective not tied directly to the individual
services
2. Supplement Service Advice: supplement service-based
advice with cross-service perspective provided by the
Chairman. To ensure that individual service
viewpoints continue to be well represented throughout
the decision process, two safeguards are proposed:
a) In formulating joint positions, the Chairman
should be required to consult fully with the other
members of the JCS.
b) On issues of crucial national importance, the
Chairman should be required to provide civilian
leaders with the individual positions of the
chiefs to the extent that they differ from the
Chairman's recommendation.
3. Joint Staff -amend the NSA to provide for the joint
staff to report directly to the Chairman as opposed
to JCS as a corporate body. Chairman should manage
the staff independent of JCS.
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4. Deputy Chairman-a four-star general or flag officer
chosen from a different service than the Chairman,
would act in Chairman's stead, and be the director of
the staff.
1. The Chairman as the Primary Military Advisor
The proposal to designate CJCS as the principal
advisor to the President, SECDEF and the NSC, has generated
a great deal of literature both supporting and opposing the
idea. This is to be expected as its implementation would
severely diverge from the current structure in which the
advice of all of the Service Chiefs is heard in conjunction
with that of the Chairman.
The major argument against such a proposal
originates in the fear of filtering important issues and
topics, and preventing them from being reviewed by the
civilian side of DOD (namely SECDEF) and Congress. General
Robert H. Barrow, former Commandant of the Marine Corps,
expressed an opinion as follows:
"Any arrangement with a Chairman serving as the
Srincipal military advisor and having control of the
oint Staff, regardless of any disclaimers to the
contrary, is essentially a Supreme Chief of
Staff -General Staff System.'"6
He continues by saying,
"Such a system would isolate from the civilian
leadership the most expert military advice-that of the
JCS , including the four Chiefs of Service. The
arrangement would prevent the development of legitimate
alternatives that should be presented to appropriate
civilian authority for decision." 7
6 This system is expressly forbidden by the National
Security Act
7 Marine Corps Gazette , September 1982
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This opinion is strongly supported by another
distinguished Marine General, General Louis H. Wilson, also
former Commandant of the Marine Corps, when he addressed the
issue saying,
"Analysis of existing legislation concerning the current
organization thus snows that the establishment of a
single chief of staff is prohibited because such
concentration of power in one military man would violate
the traditional principle of civilian control over the
military now exercised through the Secretary of Defense
and rival the Presidential power as Commander-in-Chief.
In addition, such a powerful individual could prevent
minority and majority views on military problems from
reaching the Secretary of Defense, the National Security
Council, or the President, thus precluding the most
intelligent and sound decisions." 8
Some authors go even farther in their disaffection
for this proposal by proposing the elimination of the
position of the Chairman of the JCS completely. In his
recent book on DOD organization, Victor H. Krulak,
Lieutenant General, USMC (Ret ), strongly advocates
elimination of the Chairman's position. He states,
"The very existence of the Chairman, in his present
role, degrades the Joint Chiefs as a corporate military
body and diminishes their usefulness to the nation.
That usefulness will be degraded further should current
proposals for additional enhancement of the Chairman's
authority be translated into law." [Ref. 38: p. 125]
While he strongly advocates the concept of the JCS
organization, and that the case for its existence is
well-made, he argues that the case for the existence of the
Chairman has not been made in the thirty-six year life of
the organization. [Ref. 39: p. 125]
These opinions are further joined by the staff
writers of the Senate Armed Services Committee in their
defense reorganization report inwhich they call for the





established. Quoting the Armed Forces Journal (October
1985) summary of the staff report, the staff's specific
recommendation was to "Disestablish the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and thereby, permit the Service Chiefs to dedicate
all their time to Service duties." [Ref. 40: p. 47]
These opinions are well stated, and constitutionally
based, however there is also a great deal of support for the
counter proposal of making the CJCS the primary advisor to
SECDEF, NSC and the President. The CSIS study argues that
all JCS .members are faced with an inherent conflict between
their service responsibilities and loyalties, and those of
their primary assignment on the JCS staff.
The members of the JCS organization, performing
functions as the senior military advisory group for the
nation, must provide that advice from a position which
transcends individual service concerns. Although this would
seem obvious or naturally expected on the surface, as stated
in the CSIS study, carrying it out is not easy.
The JCS, due to its committee system, requires all
services to approve of, or comment on, each issue which
comes before it. This essentially provides a veto power by
each service over the other services. The strong incentives
to protect their own service programs inherently prevents a
JCS member from vetoing another's program for fear of
retaliation against his own programs.
The CSIS study continues to point out that the
National Security Act of 1947 specifically states that the
Service Chief's joint role should take precedence over his
duties as leader of a Service. The fear of retaliation from
other services makes this responsibility difficult at best.
These characteristics are not the only significant
road blocks to the functioning of the organization. A JCS
member's professional performance is highly imbedded in the
support he gives his service while a JCS member. If the
31
parent service views his performance as contrary to service
objectives, his chances of promotion are potentially greatly
reduced.
To say that the JCS member never goes against his
parent service opinions or advice would be naive. However,
to do so more than only very seldom would be suicidal for
his current assignment, and for future promotion. Differing
too often, or on fundamental issues, will result in the loss
of confidence by his own service, and loss of support by his
service which is essential to being effective as a JCS
member. [Ref. 41: p. 11]
For these and many other reasons, General Jones
argues very strongly for the strengthening of the Chairman's
position. He argues that expecting the Service Chiefs to
support a position as service advocates when dealing with
their own services, and then expecting them to take a
totally differing position in their joint assignment is
unreasonable. By making the Chairman the primary advisor,
this dilemma would be removed from the Joint Chiefs by not
allowing them to address it as a body. [Ref. 42: p. 12]
In his report to the President, The National
Military Command Center
,
Richard C. Steadman argues that a
strengthened position of the Chairman would further help to
deal with the issues of resource allocation and constrained
force structure. He supports the contention that these
issues cannot be effectively dealt with under the current
dual role of a Joint Chief. [Ref. 43: p. 65]
Mr. Steadman further argues that increasing the
Chairman's role, 9 would increase the quality of the views on
budget issues in the PPBS expressed by the Commanders in
Chief (CINC' s-which are joint commands). Although the
9 Mr. Steadman proposes that the CINC ' s provide their
budget requests directly to the CJCS who would adjudicate
differences if required. This would afford the CINC's a
more representative voice with the CJCS they do not
currently posess.
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CINC's currently provide input to the budget process, the
majority of the input is left to the individual Service
Chiefs who consider only the portion of the budget that
pertains to their service, lacking a joint perspective.
[Ref. 44: p. 67]
Morton Halperin supports the CSIS proposal by
arguing for the strengthening of the CJCS position, making
him the principal military advisor, in conjunction with the
complete separation of the joint staff from the Service
Chiefs. In his book, National Security Pol icy -Making
,
he
states that the majority of the work on issues presented to
the Service Chiefs on joint issues is performed and
presented by the service staff instead of the joint staff.
It therefore reflects the views of the service as opposed to
the joint staff, making the joint staff work not only
redundant, but completely non- influential . [Ref. 45: p.
151]
Mr. Halperin argues that this proposal will leave
the Chairman and the joint staff free from the two-hatted
influence of the service/ j oint dilemma, allowing them to
develop joint positions to be presented to SECDEF and the
President. He contends this proposal will result not in the
filtering of information to the President, but instead in
increased imagination and innovation. The President would
now receive the non-prejudiced views of the Chairman, as
well as the individual service chief opinions creating a
wider spectrum of opinions than is now presented. [Ref. 46:
p. 152]
General Jones sums up the argument when he says
,
"Without a stronger role . . . for the Chairman, the
work of the Joint Chiefs is likely to remain too
dispersed, diluted, and diffused to provide the best
possible military advice or to insure the full




The primary resistance to the designation of a
single military advisor has centered around the restriction
of information, from the services and the Joint Chiefs, to
higher authority. The CSIS proposal addresses this
long-standing fear by eliminating the problem.
Under the CSIS proposal the Chairman would be
required to consult fully with the other members of the JCS
as he now does. This in itself is not a departure from
current practice. However, on issues of significant
national importance, he would be required to provide
civilian leaders with the positions of the service chiefs,
addressing those areas where they differ from the
Chairman' s
.
As can be seen from the arguments, previously
presented opposing the Chairman's position as the principal
military advisor, insuring the flow of opposing viewpoints
from the Service Chiefs would alleviate the fear of stifling
potentially important descenting views. This would support
Mr. Halperin's opinion that an increased spectrum of
viewpoints would now potentially be possible to be
considered by SECDEF, NSC and the President, as opposed to
the limited views currently expressed.




Under the third and fourth CSIS proposals, the joint
staff would be separated from the Service Chiefs, working
directly for the Chairman, and be managed by a four-star
Deputy. One of the major arguments in the past against such
a proposal originates from the fear of giving the Deputy a
voting position as a member of the JCS. This would result
in a loss in voting strength by the services on certain
issues. The Chairman is normally the tie-breaker on issues
where split decisions (tie votes) result. With the Navy and
Marine Corps generally voting together on most issues , a
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voting block against them by the Air Force and the Army can
only be broken by the Chairman. [Ref. 48: p. 29] With a
deputy being designated as a voting member, this could
potentially increase the power base against the Navy/Marine
coalition affording them the most to loose if the position
is created. This would create a very "unsettling"
atmosphere in the current power relationships. 10 [Ref. 49:
P- 29]
The CSIS proposal, however does not allow for the
deputy to be a voting member. His primary role would be to
insure continuity in the direction of the staff both in long
term goals and daily operations. Under the direction of the
Deputy
,
the joint staff would not be menaced by the desires
of the Chairman/Deputy and the Service Chiefs, now in
effect. They would instead have only one task-master- the
Deputy, under the direction of the Chairman.
As stated earlier by Mr. Halperin, the majority of
the work for a Service Chief when addressing joint issues,
is performed by the service staff as opposed to the joint
staff. This can be seen when the membership of the service
and joint staffs are compared. For each joint staff member
working on a particular issue, there is estimated to be
thirty service staff members working on that same issue.
[Ref. 50: p. 28]
In the past, not only was the recommendation on the
issue presented to the Service Chief likely to be more
highly researched, it was totally influenced by the
individual service perspective. The very nature of the
paper process within the organization resulted in action
officers seeking the lowest common denominator, the most
agreeable language on which all services would agree.
Additionally, the higher the paper progressed up the
10 This would, of course, not be a problem if either the
CJCS or the Deputy-OJCS were a Navy/Marine Corps officer.
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organizational ladder, the more political it became, as
opposed to maintaining a purely military perspective. Once
in the hands of the JCS , the paper was so diluted, that the
Joint Chiefs' decisions appeared indecisive and oatmealy .
[Ref. 51: p. 22] Although this situation has existed in the
past, it is not expected to be the significant problem in
the future that it was. This is mostly attributable to the
more effective paper process. [Ref. 52]
The Chairman, is virtually the only individual
within the JCS organization who is interested in the
organization functioning in a "joint" manner. The services
all have a vested interest in the organization being
ineffective as a joint staff. [Ref. 53: p. 537] Although
the action officer writes the first draft setting the
general tone of the paper, he may still rely heavily on his
own service inputs on how it should be written. Hence,
again, the service perspective as opposed to joint dialogue.
[Ref. 54: p. 18]
C. PROPOSAL 2: ADJUSTING JOINT MILITARY STRUCTURES
The second proposal dealing with adjusting the joint
military structure, focusses on the function of the Chairman
and his staff. The Chairman, with assistance of the joint
staff should prepare force planning recommendations
constrained by realistic projections of future resources,
based on policy and fiscal guidance issued by the Secretary
of Defense.
If inadequate policy guidance is issued within the DOD
,
subordinate commanders must look for their own guidance in
developing their budget inputs. In dealing with force
planning, accurate policy direction is a prerequisite in
forming the basis for military planning, and from which the
DOD programs and budget are derived. [Ref. 55: p. 42]
There are four major phases involved in force planning:
1. Determination of national objectives;
2. Determination of military objectives;
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3. Preparation of an objective force;
4. Application of fiscal constraints to the objective
force to derive the attainable force.
The JCS contributes to all of these phases. [Ref. 56: p.
25]
As established in the CSIS report, the major input
provided by the JCS to the budget process is the Joint
Strategic Planning Document ( JSPD) . The annual planning
cycle within DOD starts with issuance of this document.
This document has normally been constructed without
significant fiscal constraint. The force structure
recommended is one which assures national security, however,
it is one which Congress is not willing to support. As a
result, it has received unfavorable attention, although it
is still the planning ruler by which risks inherent in the
alternative force structures, eventually decided upon, can
be assessed.
The CSIS report points out that this publication does
not assess priorities, or trade-offs necessary for achieving
a budget within the limitations of the likely funding levels
approved by Congress. In this way, it can only be of
limited use to SECDEF in allocating defense resources.
The Chairman would be tasked, under the CSIS proposal,
with developing an additional JSPD which details the
priorities, and optimal combination of defense resources to
meet the expected budget limitations. SECDEF must currently
rely upon his civilian staff (instead of the military
expertise of the JCS) to make these resource allocation
decisions. Tasking the Chairman with this responsibility
allows a cross-service input into this document which is
currently not there, and which cannot be achieved under the
current forum.
The major effect of the JSPD is designed to be the
Defense Guidance which is SECDEF ' s annual statement on force
structure, policy, strategy, and most important, fiscal
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guidance. [Ref. 57: p. 7] It is this document from which
the respective services will design and propose their
Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which will later result
in their input to the defense budget. [Ref. 58: p. 7]
Through an ineffective input (currently experienced)
resulting from an indecisive JSPD, SECDEF is left to make
these policy decisions himself with only the help of his own
staff. Solid military advice will not necessarily be
utilized in these decisions. Given a worthwhile input on
the JSPD from CJCS , SECDEF would be better able to guide the
services in the most appropriate program design in
developing their budgets.
Lawrence B. Tatum describes the current system by
saying,
"The present JCS planning process operates to achieve
unanimous military agreement. Until the present
accommodation (wording of issue papers to appease all
services) philosophy is changed, . . . the military
voice in defense policy formulation will continue to be
weak. If, to attain quality military advice, unity on
JCS papers must be sacrificed, perhaps the sacrifice is
worth making. The civilian in any case is going to play
a major role in defense policy formulation . . . He is
going to continue playing an inordinately large role,
however, as long as achievement of consensus is the
force guiding military strategists." [Ref. 59: p. 386]
Mr. Tatum continues by saying,
"The attempt to formulate a single military point of
view on strategy- through the JCS planning process-has
failed. The danger is that planning- theorizing about
war-may be done mostly by people having no relevant
knowledge of combat or of field preparation for various
modes of combat . . . Until we learn that A on mostdefense policy issues, a single "military position
cannot be attained without unacceptable reduction of
quality, the input of a thousand modern Napoleons into
the Pentagon will make very little difference, and
defense policy formulation will remain the primary
domain of the civilian." [Ref. 60: p. 392]
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D. PROPOSAL 3: THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
The last proposal dealing with the joint military
structure discusses the unified and specified commands. The
unified and specified commanders should be given a stronger
institutional role in the resource allocation process and
greater authority over their component commands
.
Specifically:
1. A separate program and budget should be established to
cover the in-tneater operational costs of the unified
and specified commands;
2. The Chairman should replace the corporate JCS as the
transmitter of orders from civilian authorities to the
CINC's;
3. The CINC's should be given greater operational
authority over their component commands
.
These three proposals will be considered as a group.
The major result of the proposals as they relate to JCS
budget influence will probably be derived from the granting
to the CINC's greater control and authority over resource
allocation. Through greater control over resources, the
CINC's may experience greater efficiency in the utilization
of funds. Any greater efficiency attained may have
potential in cost savings. If cost savings result, the
argument for the armed forces will potentially be improved.
Although these statements rely upon several "ifs", the
overall argument has merit.
There is a trend to allow greater input by the CINC's to
the budget process. Recently, they have provided comments
to SECDEF on the drafting of the Defense Guidance as well as
providing input to the Defense Resources Board (DRB) on
issues developed in the POM. [Ref. 61: p. 8] However, these
inputs are seen as having only a minor effect on budget
decisions, and more significant steps are still required.
The CSIS study argues that the CINC's retain full
operational command of the forces assigned to them.
Peacetime operations, however, curtail this authority in the
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areas of logistical support, training, and maintenance.
Each unified command is organized with components of each of
the individual services which make it up. These component
services report directly to their parent service
departments, effectively usurping significant control away
from the CINC's in these resource areas.
The CINC's are well-known for exercising authority in
form rather than in fact. It was not uncommon in the past
for the service components of the joint commands to outrank
the CINC. [Ref. 62: p. 31] Even in Vietnam, the complaint
of the service interests not being subordinated to the
interests of common concern was continuously made.
[Ref. 63: p. 31] Complaints of R & D not being oriented
towards tHe needs of the war; internal needs of the services
being given priority over war needs; command rotation policy
favoring giving everyone a turn instead of achieving the
most efficient level of operations were all prevalent, and
contributed significantly to the CINC's inability to carry
out the operational charter it is tasked with. [Ref. 64: p.
31]
With these several aspects of their operations being
decided upon elsewhere, and outside of their chain of
command, the CINC's are virtually powerless in influencing
them. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of a single
military superior in Washington. [Ref. 65: p. 53] With a
single military superior advocating their position in the
Washington arena, the influence of the CINC's individually
and collectively would be greatly enhanced. [Ref. 66: p.
54]
In his book Reappraising Defense Organization , Mr.
Barrett strongly recommends consideration of consolidating
theater-wide support at the unified command level, [Ref. 67:
p. 260] supporting the position of the CSIS proposal. The
service perspective on force employment is towards
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maintaining their assigned forces as opposed to operating
them. In this context, it is quite expected that the
services will assign a lower priority to the operational
needs of the CINC's. [Ref. 68: p. 19] Consolidation of
theater organization operational requirements as they relate
to the budget will insure a "more fair day in court" for the
CINC's.
With stronger ties between the Chairman and the CINC's,
a joint military perspective with an institutional base
would be created. Both would defend the joint position just
as the Navy now defends the Naval Tactical Air position.
This new institutional component of joint military views
would compete much more strongly with current service views
.
[Ref. 69: p. 265] Civilian leadership would now have two
military viewpoints on issues of disagreement, and would be
better-served with this added perspective. All players
(JCS, CINC's, and civilian leadership) would gain in this
situation. Either from the stand point of increased
influence within the DOD organization, or by a larger input
to the decision-making process. [Ref. 70: p. 265]
E. CONCLUSIONS
What effect will all of this have on the JCS ability to
influence the budget? It is hard to say that it will not
have any influence. Almost any change in the organizational
structure of the JCS will likely have some impact on its
operations, and influence within its environment. To say
that it will have a great deal of impact is just as
difficult. However, there are several aspects of these
changes which must be considered.
There is nothing in these proposals, thus far, which
significantly changes the mission of the JCS as an advisory
organization. These proposals do, however, attempt to bring
greater efficiency and effectiveness to the job they must
perform. It is not clear, however, that these changes will
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provide the desired result. Where required, the proposals
recommend constitutional changes to make legal those
recommendations
.
One of the major factors in these proposals will be the
perception of the organization by those who must rely on it,
if the proposals are enacted. The JCS must posess
credibility within DOD, Congress, and the administration.
Its ability to submit worthwhile advice to these end-users
is crucial to its ability to influence those processes it is
engaged in. In its current form, the JCS does not lack
credibility from the standpoint of the individual service
advice it offers, but it does lack credibility as a group in
its ability to work together in a joint forum to provide
national defense advice from collective discussion and
agreement
.
Few people in organizations of power (DOD, Congress,
etc.) desire to spend their time with, nor place much
credibility in organizations which they consider to be
lame-duck. Few organizations will accept advice, or act on
recommendations from organizations which are viewed as
lacking power or authority.
Through their inability to provide anything other than
watered-down joint recommendations, the JCS is viewed as
"indecisive", and "powerless", having their decisions either
ignored, or sharply modified or criticized by SECDEF . In
the past, Congress has been satisfied to have the JCS
maintain this operational affliction. [Ref. 71: p 532]
These proposals, however, will work towards increasing
credibility by strengthening the organization from the
standpoint of output quality, and perceived credibility.
Perceptions play a significant role in how organizations
react to each other. When the administration, or SECDEF
decides on arbitrary or unsupported budget funding levels,
without input from the JCS, not only does this give JCS the
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appearance of non-inf luence , but it creates the perception
in Congress of the administration not trusting supposedly
one of the most professional groups of individuals it has
working for it. The JCS ends up performing a paper work
drill which turns into "make-work".
To say the JCS is totally without influence is naive.
To say that it is one of the most influential groups in the
DOD budget process is incorrect. The JCS lies somewhere to
the left of the middle of the two extremes. This position
is extremely wasteful given the potential resource the
nation has in this organization. The need to better this
position is great. Solid, effective recommendations
concerning budget levels to provide for effective national
security should be a JCS forte. To settle for something
less, wastes a valuable resource, and could potentially
threaten national security. -
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IV. THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
A. OVERVIEW
The proposals of the CSIS study go far beyond the
singular restructuring of the JCS organization. In the
nation's defense labyrinth, the achievement of reform will
rarely come as a result of simple changes to one
organization. 11 The CSIS group states the continuation of
the first set of proposals as follows:
"It is likely that the beneficial effects of
strengthening joint military institutions would be
wasted unless these improvements were matched with
changes in the structure and role of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). In our view, weaknesses in
OSD's organization and procedures affect its performance
in three ways: (1) OSD's internal structure does not
conform to the departments strategic purposes, thereby
weakening its ability to provide clear, consistent
policy direction, (2) There is inadequate institutional
voice for such operational concerns as readiness and
sustainability
, \3) The OSD staff is too heavilyinvolved in the details of program management and is too
large. By correcting these deficiencies, we believe
that OSD will be in a better position to help the
secretary carry out his most important
functions-providing overall policy direction and program
guidance and making major resource allocation
choices-without excessive involvement in those specifics
of program management that are best left to the military
departments and operational commands."
The next three CSIS proposals center around the
assistants to SECDEF, and the size of the DOD staff.
Specifically, the proposals are as follows:
1. Expand the role of the under secretary of defense for
policy to include responsibility for program
integration on a mission basis;
2. Establish a third under secretary responsible for
functions related to readiness;
3. Reduce the size of the OSD staff.
11 This is not to imply that the proposals thus far are
in any way simplistic. Though complex in themselves, they
are only a part of the entire network of changes which may,
together, bring about desired reform.
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The intended result of these proposals is to improve the
guidance function of OSD, by streamlining areas of
responsibility within the OSD staff. The proposals will be
evaluated in a similar manner as before, evaluating each
separately, and then from the standpoint of their collective
interaction.
At this point, a few words should be dedicated to the
subject of the relationship of the JCS to the Secretary of
Defense and his staff. As explained by Mr. John Kester, the
Service Chiefs, as JCS members, are probably more aware than
the joint staff that works for them, that one rarely
improves his position of influence by not giving the boss
what he wants. In the case of the JCS, the boss is the
Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 72: p. 531] Mr. Kester points
out, that if SECDEF cannot get the information and advice he
needs from JCS, he will turn to alternate sources. This is
well substantiated in the actions of Secretary Robert
McNamara when he greatly expanded his staff through the
establishment of an assistant secretary to provide him with
program alternatives he could not get from JCS. [Ref. 73:
p. 531]
It can be seen that the need for strong interaction and
mutual support of these organizations is crucial for the
meaningful performance of their assigned tasking. To be
influential in any of the missions they must perform, and
specifically in the budget area, JCS must be able to get
along with OSD, as well as maintain credibility in OSD's
eyes by providing meaningful advice.
B. THE PRINCIPAL ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Before proceeding with the proposals, a summary of the
individuals currently assisting SECDEF is worthwhile. These
individuals all have specific areas of responsibility. The
CSIS report proposes to expand some of these
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responsibilities to achieve greater consistency between how
the OSD organization is structured, and how the defense
agencies under the SECDEF staff provide it with information.
The Secretary of Defense has essentially twelve major
staff assistants. Each has his own staff to deal with the
various issues before them. These assistant positions and
their responsibilities are delineated below:
a. Deputy Secretary of Defense: acts for and exercises
the authority of the Secretary of Defense in
coordinating DOD activities as directed by SECDEF;
b. The Assistant Secretary of Defense Comptroller:
provides advice and assistance to SECDEF in the areas
of PPBS , resource management throughout DOD, problem
identification and correction;
c. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs:
responsible for health and sanitation matters
including care and treatment of patients, training of
medical personnel, drug and alcohol abuse control, and
clinical investigations;
d. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
Installations and Logistics: responsible for civilian
and military personnel policies, including force
structure analysis as related to quantitative and
qualitative manpower requirements, manpower
utilization, manpower programs development, and
control of military and civilian manpower strengths,
equal opportunity, logistics and materiel management,
program integration, facilities and environmental
quality, mobilization planning and requirements;
e. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs:
responsible for exercising overall supervision of
Reserve component matters in DOD
f. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy: responsible
for policy matters relating to overall international
security policy and political military affairs;
g. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs : provides advice and recommends
policies, programs, plans, and guidance to DOD
agencies with respect to political military affairs
other than NATO, European countries, and the Soviet
Union;
h. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy:. serves as the focal point for long
and mid-range policy on strategic and international
security matters, and is responsible for developing
and recommending policies concerning disarmament and
arms control and East-West security negotiations;
i. Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering: advises on scientific and technical
matters, basic applied research, environmental
services; and the research, development, testing and
procurement of all DOD weapons systems;
46
j. Program Analysis and Evaluation: under the direction
of SECDEF, this staff formulates force planning,
fiscal programming, and policy guidance upon which DOD
force planning and program projections will be based;
k. General Council: chief legal officer of Department of
Defense;
1. Inspector General: conducts, supervises, monitors,
and initiates audits and investigations relating to
the programs and operations of DOD.
Other functional areas assisting SECDEF include: Public
Affairs, Net Assessment (preparation of assessments for
SECDEF), Legislative Affairs, Executive Secretary, Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization. [Ref. 74: pp. 162-165]
Changing the OSD organization may be extremely
beneficial to the JCS in improving their influence in all
aspects of their missions. Quoting Theodore W. Bauer and
Harry B. Yoshpe, in their book 12 Defense Organization and
Management
,
"The Department of Defense is, and must be, a dynamic
organization. Changes of missions and methods, of
technology and emphasis, developments of special
requirements, and discoveries of better ways of dividing
the work, all bring about changes of structure and
function which must be a part of every day operations."
[Ref. 75: p. 8]
They go on to explain that organizational structures
which are never right to begin with, need periodic
shake-ups. If these restructurings do not occur, the
organization becomes less sound, because of the dynamics of
organizational existence. The "right" organizational
structure applies only for a specific period of time and in
a specific environment. Regardless of these points alone,
changes in personalities, approaches and methods create an
inevitability in organizational change, and management
12 For further discussion, see "Secretary of Defense"
Defense Top Management Annual Report 1966
,
Armed Forces
Management 13"; no" 1
, p . 4~4~
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patterns. 13 [Ref. 76: p. 8] The JCS have worked with the
current OSD organization for a long time. Its present
structure may contribute significantly to JCS
ineffectiveness in many areas.
It should be noted that this paper is not advocating
that change for change sake is justification enough for
restructuring the OSD organization. However, if, due to
personality changes, environmental changes, or because the
organizational structure was not "right" initially,
organizational change should not be delayed. Change should
then be a high priority to make the organization as
effective as possible. Each part of the organization must
be effective by itself to contribute to the organization as
a whole.
C. PROPOSAL 1: ALIGNING OSD WITH THE THREE MISSION
CATEGORIES
The first proposal addressing modification within the
OSD organization follows: The role of the under secretary
of defense for policy should be expanded to include
responsibility for program integration on a mission basis.
He would retain responsibility for drafting the Defense
Guidance, but would broaden his involvement in the program
and budget review process. An assistant secretary for each
of the three major mission categories would be assigned:
nuclear deterrence, North Atlantic and European defense, and
regional defense.
The October 1985 SASC staff report recommends a similar
organization which would be made up af three under
secretaries each with responsibility for one of the three
areas listed above. [Ref. 77: p. 47] The staff report
varies from the CSIS proposal by elevating the new positions
to under secretaries as opposed to incorporating these areas
13 For further discussion, see Organizational Structures
and Planning
,
Rand Paper P-3316 by James K~. Schlesinger
,
Rand Corporation, 1966, pp. 3-4
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under one the direction of one under secretary. Whether or
not the change in organization follows the CSIS report or
the SASC staff report, the argument over the current
structure concerning resources as opposed to mission is
further supported by the SASC staff report.
Perhaps the time for organizational restructuring in
this policy guidance area of OSD-JCS relationships is ripe.
To improve this relationship, the CSIS group contends that
the time has come to organize the OSD staff, specifically
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, with a structure
that mirrors the mission areas on which JCS and the Service
departments must advise.
As can be seen from the list of SECDEF assistants,
SECDEF receives, or has available, advice on every
conceivable issue which he may have to address. All of the
information that he needs may presently be available in one
form or another. However, structural problems in its format
alone may be causing ineffective transmission of this
information.
At the risk of being too elementary, an example may be
worthwhile. A typical ship of the line is divided into
essentially four functional or mission areas: Combat
Systems, Engineering, Ship Control (Deck, Seamanship,
Navigation, Communications), and Supply. The Commanding
Officer receives and requests information concerning the
functional areas around which his ship was designed. He
does not expect to receive information on supply from
somewhere within the combat systems area. He does not
expect to receive engineering information from somewhere in
the ship control area.
For the various department heads to provide the
Commanding Officer with information in areas that should
rightly be handled in another area would be extremely
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ineffective. Information would not only be less accurate,
it would lack perspective, cohesion and consistency with
information in the area in which it belongs.
At present, the mission categories of DOD center around
the three areas listed earlier. The method for receiving
and evaluating information within the OSD staff, however,
does not conform to these mission areas. Again, as can be
seen from the description of responsibilities for his staff
assistants, SECDEF has bits of information coming from
various sources. These sources are not necessarily
interacting in their determination and evaluation of issues.
Instead, issues are addressed in segregated areas of the OSD
organization. The result is a lack of consistency with the
"job description" assigned to JCS and the service
departments
.
In the past, the three areas have been addressed by
separate assistant secretaries. This is a major frustration
to the system of policy making within DOD. The problem,
addressed again by Mr. Bauer and Mr. Yoshpe, generates the
question of "whether the organizational arrangements in DOD
foster or impede the coherent resolution of the issues of
purpose, strategy, and organization . . . ." [Ref. 78: p.
14]
The basic change proposed by the CSIS group, is
essentially a wiring-diagram change. It does not alter in
any way the substance of advice provided by the JCS and the
services. It does, however, attempt improvement in the
channeling of that information to OSD. If OSD receives
information along the same functional lines that it is given
to them, the potential for greater understanding of the
issues presented by OSD could very well improve their
ability to deal with the information provided. Obviously,
this works both ways. The policy guidance provided JCS and
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the services by OSD, can only be more clearly understood,
and more effectively and efficiently acted on, if both are
"playing from the same sheet of music".
The service departments currently have responsibilities
for the three broad mission categories mentioned above:
Nuclear defense, North Atlantic and European defense, and
Regional defense. Each of the services contributes in some
way to each of these missions. Operations plans, specific
taskings, and force orientation are all developed from these
three central areas of concern. [Ref. 79] Policy guidance,
as shown above, does not come from OSD in this format.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is currently
tasked with producing the Defense Guidance (DG). All of the
services develop their Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
from this document. The POM must be tailored to the format
of the DG, addressing the areas in that document. [Ref. 80]
The structural design of the document by section is as
follows
:
1. Threat Assessment: appraisal of the world environment
and threats to U.S. interests;
2. Policy Guidance: addresses general goals of DOD
providing overall direction for development of
national military strategy. force planning;
unconstrained by availability of resources;
3. Strategy Guidance: provides national military
strategy for countering the threat during the FYDP
period and beyond;
4. Force Planning Guidance: addresses tasks to be
carried out by DOD components in developing major
combat and defense-wide support forces needed to
execute the strategy;
5. Resources Planning Guidance: specified programming
criteria and- priorities for the allocation of defense
resources, principally in the areas of readiness,
sustainability , modernization and industrial base;
6. Fiscal Guidance: provides DOD components total
oblig'ational authority projection for the FYDP plan
ten year extended planning period;
7. Major Issues: statement of problems affecting the
defense guidance requiring study or top management
attention. [Ref. 81J
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This shows that the DG does not reflect by
organizational format the mission categories of the Defense
Department, in structure or content. As stated earlier by
the CSIS proposal, OSD's internal structure does not conform
to the departments strategic purposes, causing a weakening
in its ability to provide clear consistent policy direction
to DOD. This issue is fully supported within the text of
the DG itself. The 1985 Defense Guidance
,
under the Major
Issues section, specifically addresses the need to review
the DG due to problems experienced in the past. It requires
the assignment of a special study group for this purpose.
It states:
"The purpose of this study is to identify problems
ascribed to the current organization of Sections IV and
V of the Defense Guidance and to analyze alternate
structures. Alleged problems include weak linkages;
redundancy; lack of consistency; difficulty in assessing
the af fordability of MTO ' s (Mid-Term Objectives); and
emphasis on resource inputs rather than defense outputs.
Attention should be paid to verifying the existence of
these potential problems, and determining their origin
and remedy. The structure of Section l-III although
considered adequate, shall not be excluded if the
conduct or completion of the study warrants their
conclusion." [Ref. 82: p. 112]
The DG should be structurally arranged such that it is
prioritized in a manner consistent with the broad general
mission categories of the defense department. The Services
and the JCS must presently pick through bits and pieces of
the DG , to find issues related to these mission areas and
put them together conceptually into a policy format with
which they can work. This should not be the case.
It may appear almost nit-picky, in some ways, to be
concerned with this issue. It may have aspects of
exaggeration, when considering the overall scheme, to say
that SECDEF needs to "reorganize his chapters" so that they
are more comprehendable by the reader. If one steps back
and considers, however, that the issues being debated are
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issues of national security, upon which the nation must
depend, then all aspects of this argument take on a
different perspective.
The Services and JCS require clear concise policy
guidance from above. They cannot afford to piece-meal
defense policy by picking through the DG , and then
assembling the policies regarding the mission categories
they must work with in a complete, understandable format.
It should be the responsibility of SECDEF to articulate
clearly and concisely, in universal format, what the
policies concerning these mission categories are.
The CSIS study proposes to organize and distribute
thinking about policy issues along the lines of the mission
categories. As the CSIS proposal suggests, below the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, three assistant secretary
positions would be created. Each would be responsible for
one category. Each would be tasked with developing the
issues and policies in their specified areas. They would be
under one "boss" who would provide consistent
non-conflicting guidance to them on issues they are
confronting. Instead of having three to four different
Assistant Secretaries of Defense providing guidance to three
to four individuals in their own staffs (each with a little
different perspective on the situation) , DOD would have one
under secretary and three assistants working together to
resolve policy issues aligned appropriately with military
missions. The Services as well as JCS would have one
central point of contact within OSD to address
quest ions / comment s / argument at ion
.
D. PROPOSAL 2: CREATION OF A THIRD UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
The next proposal concerns the establishment of a third
under secretary: A third under secretary of defense should
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be established with broad policy oversight responsibilities
for functions related to the readiness and sustainability of
the operational forces.
This has been an area of concern for almost two decades.
In 1970, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel found difficulty in
this same area. Their specific recommendation was to
establish an Under Secretary of Defense for Operations.






f. Defense Communications Agency;
g. Civil Defense Agency. [Ref. 83: p. 55]
This panel saw the need for bringing together the
different organizational functions within OSD which dealt
directly with the readiness side of the department. They
recognized that those functional areas of defense which
contributed to readiness would be better coordinated under
one under secretary. [Ref. 84: p. 25]
The operationally ready forces are assigned to the
unified and specified commands. Under this organizational
format, the essential elements of command and operation
should be centralized under the direction of one individual
within OSD. [Ref. 85: pp. 40-41]
In addressing this issue, it is important to first focus
on what the nation's military should be "ready for." In
their paper The Problem of Military Readiness
,
Melvin Laird
and Lawrence Korb state,
"This nation raises and maintains military forces for
two primary purposes: to deter others from employing
military force against us and to conduct military
operations if deterrence should fail. The ability to be
ready to fight or conduct military operations
successfully is by far the more important of the two
functions. If our military forces are not prepared to
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fight, then few of our adversaries will be deterred from
committing hostile acts against us or our interests."
[Ref. 86: p. 1]
Sustainability concerns the ability of the United States
to engage in battle for an extended period of time. Issues
such as support lines for logistics, ready spares in forward
deployed units, reinforcement troops and equipment and
surviveability of initial combat units all contribute to the
country's ability to sustain operations on a global basis.
[Ref. 87: p. 13] The requirement to centralize these issues
under the direction of one individual rather than under
several individuals is clear. The area of sustainability
needs clear consistent direction from a central dedicated
staff. There is presently no equivalent, or specifically
assigned assistant to SECDEF who has direct cognizance over
these areas
.
In their paper, Melvin Laird and Lawrence Korb conclude
that U.S. military forces are not ready for combat, or to
conduct sustained operations. Although their paper does not
specifically address the suggestion by the CSIS group
concerning the creation of a third under secretary, their
conclusion lends credence to the proposal. They sight
several examples why they have reached the conclusions they
have. Several of these follow:
a. The Navy's 12 air wings are only enough to place one
wing on each carrier- ideally one third more airwings
than carriers is desireable to meet potential
operational requirements;
b. All ground, sea, and air forces have numerical
shortfalls in personnel and equipment;
c. Current airlift capability is inadequate to handle a
contingency or half -war scenario;
d. Forces likely to be moved to the Arabian Gulf area
lack both the size and firepower to handle most
contingencies they may encounter in that area;
e. Naval air power in the late 1980 's will be ten percent
smaller due to the lack of allowance to procure
replacement aircraft from attrition;
f. The U.S. does not currently have the industrial base,
transportation capability, or the people to fight a
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prolonged war in Europe. A lead time of at least
sixty days after mobilization would be required for
U.S. industrial munitions plants to start producing
additional ammunition;
g. Tactical aircraft of all of the armed services have
severe shortages of spare parts;
h. At any one time, approximately 17 percent of DOD '
s
units are in planned overhaul while 15 percent suffer
from a major deficiency in at least one area that is
serious enough to prevent them from carrying out some
combat missions;
i. U.S. capabilities are declining relative to those of
the Soviet Union;
j . Sustainability is a problem in all components of the
U.S. armed forces;
k. Retention of trained, skilled and experienced
personnel is poor, and becoming worse 1 " [Ref. 88: pp.
4-26]
Again, the study by Melvin Laird and Lawrence Korb did
not address the correction of these problems through
reorganization of OSD. The problems discussed above are
only a partial list of the problems mentioned in their
report. They illustrate, however, that there are a wide
range of problems facing the armed forces in their ability
to insure the security of the nation.
These problems all concentrate in the areas of
operational readiness and sustainability. These problems
are currently addressed by several different assistant
secretaries. The need to improve the capability of the
armed forces should start with the concentration of these
issues within one office of OSD. Until one individual has
authority over confronting these issues, the approach within
OSD will continue to be splintered action in each area.
Testimony before Congress on important programs and issues
will not have a consistent voice.
1
"This data is current as of mid- 1980. Although it
represents data which is somewhat dated, it is accurate to
state that the numbers and issues have changed very little
as of this writing.
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E. PROPOSAL 3: REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE OSD STAFF
The third proposal addressing reform within OSD follows:
In the context of the realignment described previously, we
believe that the secretary of defense should review the
staffing needs of OSD and Washington Headquarters Services
with a view to making substantial reductions in its size.
One of the most frequently cited problems in management
effectiveness studies is the problem of "over management" or
"micro management". The fact that this criticism is so
frequently found does not under-play its importance in any
way. On the contrary, it tends to reaffirm the need for
continual attention in this area.
This is a real problem, and one which can be found to




compares criticisms found in five major defense organization
studies conducted since 1970. Two criticisms are
significant in this area of discussion; they are:
1. Decision making authority is overly centralized at the
secretary of defense level. Micro-management by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) results in
failure to delegate detailed management activities.
2. The secretary of defense/OSD level needs to place
freater stress on long-range planning and policy
ormulation guidance and oversight. Concentration on
those areas should replace the emphasis on detailed
management
.
Five out of these six major studies reached the same
conclusion as the criticism in the first statement. Four
out of the six studies agreed with the second statement.
[Ref. 89: p. 84] As can be seen, this is not a new problem.
The current OSD organization employs approximately
sixteen hundred people. 15 This is even after reducing the
staff by almost one third since before 1973. When comparing
15 There is some debate on these numbers. They are
approximations due to different methods of accounting for
people assigned to OSD, and whether various agencies should
or should not be considered a part of the OSD organization.
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the size of the OSD staff to that of the service staffs of
the military departments, it is apparent that OSD operates
with less than half of the people employed by the services,
and is only very slightly larger than the OJCS staff.
[Ref. 90: p. 216]
In his Report To the Secretary of Defense (Harold S.
Brown), Mr. Paul R. Ignatius also reviews previous studies
completed on the reorganization of DOD . In his report, he
discusses the findings of the General Accounting Office
Report. The major points concerning OSD over-management
reported in the GAO study follow:
1. The increasing involvement in service program
execution at the OSD level reduces the autonomy of the
Service Secretaries and thereby reduces their ability
to make decisions on issues which are more relevant to
them or on which they often have more expertise.
2. Since the Military Departments are separately
organized and the Service Secretaries are resource
managers , it is logical that they may be given the
authority to manage. They are, in effect, presidents
of operating companies. They serve many useful
functions, particularly resource management, personnel
administration, budget justification, and
establishment of unique Service policies.
3. Perhaps their most important role is that of
interpreters between the Military Staffs and OSD --
they act as a check and a balance when those parties
have jurisdictional disputes. 16 [Ref. 91: pp. 22-23]
In this same context, Mr. Ignatius' study called for
greater delineation of responsibility between OSD and the
Military Departments; specifically, where OSD's authority
ends, and where the Military Department's authority begins.
He additionally recommends the reduction of management
intervention by outside agencies within DOD. [Ref. 92: pp.
26-27]
16 For further discussion, see General Accounting Office
Report , Suggested Improvements in Staffing and Organization
of Top Management Headquarters in the Department or Defense,
AprTT^20, 19 7 6
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This study found that there was great support for the
proposal to reduce the OSD staff by as much as fifty
percent. The objective of this reduction would be to force
OSD to concentrate on policy, leaving the details of
operations to the Military Departments. In his report, he
states the size of the OSD staff alone is so immense that
its tendency is to be involved to an unjustifiable extent in
the day-to-day operating decisions of the services. While
this study specifically does not attempt to determine a
"correct" staff size to prevent these problems, it does find
that reducing the staff size could help alleviate these
difficulties. [Ref. 93: pp. 33-34]
Although micromanagement within OSD is a real problem,
it will not be solved without additional emphasis on
discipline within the OSD staffs. This discipline should,
and must come from SECDEF himself. If it does not, the
frustrations of the services will be ignored. The secretary
of defense must emphasize the need for appropriate
management practices at all levels. [Ref. 94: p. 34]
An argument often given to prevent further reduction of
the OSD staff is the continuous growth in the staff's
workload. This increase comes from various sectors
including compounding Congressional requirements, as well as
self -generated requirements within DOD. No matter what the
reasons, it is generally accepted that the workload is
increasing.
The way to deal with this problem, while at the same
time being able to afford a reduction in the OSD staff size,
is for greater service involvement. Allowing the already
large staffs maintained by the services to assist in this
ever- increasing workload, will help enable OSD to
concentrate on the areas of policy direction as opposed to
operational minutia. [Ref. 95: p. 35] The mere act of
concentrating OSD staff attention away from operations, back
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into policy, however, will in itself, create more time for
OSD staffers to focus their efforts in the area of policy -
potentially negating the requirement for further service
involvement in other areas.
F. CONCLUSIONS
The bottom line question, with respect to this paper, is
whether or not the current organization impedes the
influence of the JCS in presenting arguments to OSD. These
proposals have great significance to the JCS and the
performance of their advisory role. The bridge between what
JCS is acting on, and how the proposals from those actions
are received by OSD, must be a strong working relationship
between the two bodies. This relationship cannot be one
which is dependent on close personal or professional ties
between the various players. It must derive from sound
structural lines of communications between the
organizations. If the organizations can:
a. Communicate from the same perspective by utilizing
structurally identical documentation,
b. Concentrate the efforts of confronting the major
problems facing the readiness of the armed forces, and
c. Restrict themselves to the taskings which they are
separately assigned,
then, there can be substantial effective progress made in
the resolution of conflicting views on relevant issues. The
result must be a more effective organization. The JCS, in
conjunction with other proposals, previously discussed,
would, by definition, elevate themselves in the area of
credibility, and competence.
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V.. CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE OVERSIGHT
A. OVERVIEW
This area of the CSIS study concerns Congressional
approaches to budgets, and the function of certain
Congressional committees. The report states:
"No legislature in the world devotes as much time,
energy, and talent to decision making on the defense
budget as does the U.S. Congress. Nevertheless, almost
everyone involved in the process, in the Congress itself
and in the executive branch, has expressed
dissatisfaction both with the outcome of this effort and
the process itself. Congressional procedures for review
of the defense budget reflect and reinforce many of the
obstacles to effective policymaking and management in
the Department of Defense. In particular, the Congress
contributes to turbulence in the defense program and
budget by focusing excessively on the details or program
management. Moreover, by using its time to review
virtually every line item in the budget, the Congress
foregoes opportunities to address the more fundamental
issues of defense policy: the establishment of national
strategic priorities and the broad allocation of defense
resources toward those priorities. Changing the way
Congress reviews the budget would not only improve
legislative oversight of defense policy, but would also
encourage and reinforce reforms in the Pentagon."
B. PROPOSAL: REFOCUSSING CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW
The specific proposals in this area of the CSIS study
are as follows: To streamline the congressional review
process and refocus legislative attention on the broader
issues of national strategic priorities and allocation of
defense resources to support them, two measures are
recommended
:
1. Shifting the defense budget from an annual to a
biennial cycle;





1. The Biennial Budget
A significant amount of professional and academic
energy has been concentrated on the DOD budget, its process,
and its execution. This literature has had its major focus
on analyzing and attempting to improve the effectiveness of
the process through alternate budget methods. Over the past
few decades, the DOD budget process has undergone three
major revisions - MBO , Zero-Based Budgeting and PPBS . Each
was aimed at improving the current system by replacing it
with another altogether new system. 17 The CSIS group states
their reason for proposing a biennial budget for DOD as
follows
:
"We believe that shifting to a multi-year budget is
crucial for an effective legislative role in defense
policy. Certainly, the Congress should review the
details of budgets and weapon programs, but it need not
undertake such a time-consuming task every year for
every weapon-much less three times per year. Ideally,
budgeting would be accomplished on a multi-year basis
and weapons would be reviewed only in conjunction with
the three or four major decision milestones in their
acquisition cycle. Once it was decided to procure a
major system, authorization for purchases over several
years should be the normal practice rather than the
exception ... It would foster greater stability in
the defense planning process and ease the burden now
imposed by the annual budget process on the members of
Congress. By reducing the time spent on budget review,
a biennial cycle would allow greater efforts to be
directed at broad questions of policy oversight. And it
would permit more attention to be paid to those
long-term issues of purpose and strategy that are of the
freatest importance to the nation's security . . . At
he same time, a biennial defense budget would have a
salutary effect on internal Department of Defense
resource allocation procedures. It would impart greater
stability into the planning process. It would reduce
the amount of time the department spends on budget
issues, allowing greater attention to be paid to broader
issues of defense strategy and priorities, as well as
the evaluation of past decisions." 18
17 DOD has retained PPBS as its formal method of
budgeting.
18 The CSIS study points out that the defense budget is
reviewed in each chamber at least three times each year.
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The proposal of the CSIS study does not attempt to
replace the current budgeting system. It does modify the
current system. It may seem at first glance, that by
extending the DOD budget cycle by twelve months (biennial as
opposed to annual), the system is in effect completely
changed from its current form. After further review,
however, it should be obvious that, in fact, there is no
substantial change to the current process, and that DOD
continues the budget process just as before.
The mechanics of the CSIS-proposed biennial budget
would be as follows:
1. The administration would submit to the Congress for
debate, amendment and approval, a two-year
authorization and appropriation in the first year of
each new Congress;
2. In the second year, only relevant committees would
consider review, evaluation and oversight of programs
currently on-going;
3. Potential adjustments in the off year cycle would be
accommodated by a supplemental appropriation;
4. In the off year period, DOD would be granted wider
authority for reprogramming.
The major resistance one normally finds expressed to
changing to a biennial budget , comes from the experience of
having changed the start of the fiscal year from July to
October. The result intended from this change was to afford
Congress more time (and hence all organizations involved
with the budget) to review and pass the budget
Appropriations Act. Prior to the Budget Impoundment and
Control Act of 1974, Congress did not have enough time to
work through all of its processes by the end of June. 13
The result, in fact, was that Congress then filled
the extra three months with more reviews, and committees,
and processes, and, with the exception of FY 78, has had to
pass a continuing resolution to fund the government every
19 The first of July starting the new fiscal year
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year since! These resolutions have in some years taken as
long as the November to be resolved.
Tt is easy to see that the opponents of affording
Congress any more time to tinker with budget fear that
Congress will only again fill the extra time with more
committees, reviews, and processes. They would contend that
allowing more time for the budget will not resolve the time
problem. Congress, it is presumed, will still have
difficulty in getting the budget out.
There are other reasons why the biennial budget has
been opposed. The following arguments are the most common
in support of the current annual process:
1. Annual authorizations provide better control over
executive agencies
;
2. Annual authorizations provide better control over the
Appropriations Committees;
3. Congress has been reluctant to consider the two year
budget estimates submitted by the Administration, even
though two year estimates are required by the Budget
Act of 1974;
4. Congress has recently attempted or passed legislation
requiring an annual authorization bill for
construction and maintenance of public buildings, and
for projects within the National Science Foundation
(R&D has traditionally been a multi-year
authorization) with this tendency continuing in other
areas
;
5. The size and uncertainty of foreign assistance have
locked it into an annual authorization;
6. Congress prefers the flexibility of annual
authorizations which allows them to adjust funding
levels annually to adapt to changing conditions;
There is an overriding feeling within Congress that
annual authorizations provide a necessary
counter-balance against wide Presidential
discretionary powers, particularly within the foreign
assistance area. 20 [Ref. 97: pp. 30-31]
20 It should be noted that not all in Congress oppose a
biennial budget. On the contrary, several promote the idea.
Several members of the CSIS study group are members of
Congress, and there have been several bills introduced by
the 95th Congress to enact this change. [Ref. 96: p. 275]
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There are, of course, good reasons why a biennial
budget process should be reviewed, and potentially
implemented. Some of these come from Charles Schultz in his
book on setting national priorities in the federal budget.
He contends that the annual budget process is increasingly
poorly suited for the setting of national priorities. He
states this for two reasons:
1. Setting priorities no longer involves
t
simply a
determination of how much of the nation's resources
should be devoted to a particular purpose; it also
requires difficult decisions about how each purpose
can best be accomplished.
2. Most important decisions do not have their major
budgetary consequences immediately, but only after
several years. Effective allocation of resources and
consideration of alternative goals can be done only
with a budgetary outlook extending over time, perhaps
many years. [Ref. 98: p. 464]
He continues by saying that pretending a
"$250 billion federal budget is freshly put together
each year is an exercise in self-delusion, for both the
Congress and the executive branch. From one year to the
next, most of the changes that occur in budget
expenditures are "built in ; that is they result from
decisions made in previous years. Thus, in a single
year little can be done to restructure priorities."
However, over the long run, changes in the allocation of
budgetary resources can and do occur. He goes on to say
that undue
"concentration on a single year's budget obscures the
long-run changes that current decisions will actually
bring about. When attempts are made to cut spending,
the current annual budget process places most emphasis
on actions that affect the coming year's budget, often
at the expense of cuts that are more desirable but that
may not affect expenditures for several years.
Conversely, new programs or military weapon systems are
inaugurated with major attention to their cost in the
current budget, which may be only a small fraction of
their total cost. Tax cuts are enacted with attention
to their immediate budget impact and little
consideration to their effect on the long-run balance of
revenues and expenditures . . . While an annual budget
is essential for purposes of economic policy, a
single-year framework for conducting all of the
budgetary procedures has outlived its usefulness. Both
the Congress and the executive branch need to view the
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budget totals and major program decisions in a longer
perspective." [Ref. 99: pp. 464-465]
As can be seen, there are a great many worthy
arguments on either side of this issue. Both sides press
their points either from the realities of the current
mind-set in Congress (those opposed), or from a theoretical
perspective aimed at the realities of what should be (those
in favor). To say that either side is right would be almost
impossible. To mix the views of both sides in an equitable
union may be almost as equally impossible.
These words provide little assistance, however, in
revealing the benefit to the JCS of implementing a biennial
budget. What can be seen, is that there are difficulties in
the present system, and in modifying it. The trading of one
set of problems for another, and their requisite effect on
JCS influence within the budgeting process cannot be
assessed merely from academic discussion. To evaluate the
effects, both postulated and hidden, of shifting to a
biennial budget, this reform would have to be implemented.
No one can predict with certainty all of the aspects of this
type of change. The only certainties at the moment are that
the current system is a known entity; and, that shifting to
a biennial budget may result in effecting the JCS influence
over the budget process. In what direction it will change,
is unknown.
2 . Dividing Up the Labor
The question of who should work on which aspect of
the budget within Congress, would seem almost academic, if
not blindingly obvious . By virtue of the names of the
committees themselves, it would appear that there should be
no confusion as to who should control which areas of
authorization and appropriation. This confusion takes on
real dimensions, however, when viewed in the light of a
survey on the competence and performance of Congress, as
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viewed by the American public. The survey found that most
Americans rated Congressional competence "somewhere south of
trash collectors." [Ref. 100: p. 1] Mr. Alton Frye, in his
book A Responsible Congress , expresses his feelings on
Congress by stating, "Few institutions are in greater need
of change for the sake of change." 21
These comments are really more satirical rhetoric
than literary commentary on the view some people take of the
way Congress seems to work. They do express, however, a
certain frustration with the inability of Congress to
effectively deal with the issues before it. Some of this
frustration is reflected in the contention of the CSIS
group. They contend the authorizations and appropriations
committees are interfering in each other's areas of concern.
This has caused greater difficulty for the military
departments and the JCS to be effective in the Congressional
arena, and in carrying out their managerial and operational
responsibilities
.
In evaluating this issue, we should first look at
what the actual responsibilities of the two committees are:
1. Armed Services Committees: annually originate
legislation that authorizes about two-thirds or all
DOB expenditures which includes funding for the
procurement of weapons;
2. Appropriations Committees: legislate the remaining
one-third which includes military pay and allowances,
operations and maintenance; they may reduce, but can
not exceed authorized limits. [Ref. 101: p. 21]
Under the current operational format of these two
committees, the ability of SECDEF and his forces to gain
approval of bills submitted to Congress has become
increasingly more difficult. The once moderately straight
forward Congressional structure has blossomed into a garden
of subcommittees within committees. The greater complexity
21 A Responsible Congress
, by Alton Frye, McGraw-Hill,
1975
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of issues today, requiring greater specialization has helped
to make the number of committees grow. The current House
rule requires that each standing committee with over twenty
members have a minimum of four subcommittees. [Ref. 102: p.
78]
Although this is somewhat off the track of the CSIS
proposal, it illustrates the rapidly increasing tendency of
Congressional committees to overstep their areas of concern,
not by intention, but simply by design of the system.
This is supported by Mr. Richard Haass, in his
paper, The Role of the Congress in American Security Policy
,
when he states that in the area of foreign policy and
defense, neither the House nor the Senate has one central
committee dedicated to these areas, such as a "National
Security Affairs Committee." He points out that
"Issues in this area are, by one account, dealt with by
sixteen Senate and nineteen House committees and an even
larger number of sub- committees . What results are two
types of jurisdictional tangle: not only are foreign and
defense policy issues considered by a large number of
separate committees, but often the same matter is
considered by two or more committees." [Ref. 103: p.
551]
The problems of overlapping are common within all
areas of congressional review (not just defense). Another
example emphasizes the point. In one instance, both the
House and the Senate were investigating civil aviation. The
committees involved were the following:
"subcommittees of both the Senate and the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce; two
appropriations subcommittees that pass on the
appropriations of the Department of Commerce; a special
Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: both the
Senate and the House Committee on Government Operations;
the Senate Judiciary Committee; a special subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee: and several other
appropriations committees. No less than twelve
subcommittees were concerned with the work and policies
of civil aeronautics agencies." [Ref. 104: pp. 274-275]
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The consequence of this dilemma, is a divided
congressional perspective, which prevents the creation of
integrated coherently legislated policies. Legislation then
becomes the result of compromise, with little thought given
to the trade-offs which must be made, as well as the impact
of these trade-offs on other issues. This system produces
policies that can be in conflict with the issues originally
presented. [Ref. 105: pp. 551-52]
A deeper look into the appropriations process
reveals even more significant problems with the
congressional review process. In his book Congressional
Control of Administration , Joseph P. Harris conducts a
lengthy review of the appropriations process. In discussing
the questioning of members of the defense organizations by
committee members, he states:
"The interrogation of witnesses tends to be unsystematic
and repetitious, partly because it is common practice
for each subcommittee member to have • his turn at
questioning. Depending on the interests of each member
and his degree of acquaintance with the agency's work,
one group of questions may be searching and relate to
vital issues of policy or administration, another may
wander off into a trivial but detailed backwater. Not
many members have sufficient firsthand knowledge of the
complex programs and activities to inquire into specific
operating details. In the general atmosphere of
impromptu cross-examination, questions dealing with
important policy issues are frequently not followed up."
The decisions for appropriations often are the
decisions of one member, only a few members or potentially
even the decision of the clerk of the committee staff. He
concludes that the basis for allocation of funds to a
department or program due to the limitations of this process
is dubious at best. [Ref. 106: pp. 77-78]
Speaking in general terms, Mr. Harris states,
Congress should reconsider the whole problem of
legislative oversight of administration, including its
own organization for oversight and the various means
utilized. The present practice has developed more as an
accidental by-product of the legislative functions of
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Congress than by design. The responsibility for
oversight of the individual departments and agencies is
divided among numerous committees, resulting in a large
amount of duplication and overlapping, and the lack of
any clear responsibility. Heavy drains are placed upon
the time and energy of the heads of departments and
other executive officers by reason of the numerous
congressional committees to which they must report and
explain their actions. Legislative oversight of
administration, properly conceived and carried out, is a
safeguard against lax, inefficient and inept
administration; but excessive controls, often written
into law to correct abuses of years ago and continued
long after the need has passed, may hamper rather than
improve administration." [Ref. 107: p. 296]
The Department of Defense is currently suffering
under the uncertainty of which committee will control which
aspect of their budget
.
C. CONCLUSIONS
Each of the ideas presented in this chapter have
individual merit. Each has basis within the literature, and
within the reality of its context to be a valid proposal.
These particular issues deal directly with the budget issue.
It is unclear, however, whether the proposals presented will
result in direct support to the JCS by increasing their
influence within the budget process.
In the first instance, the proposal to shift the DOD
budget to a biennial budget may have value in increasing the
JCS influence based in the ideas previously expressed by Mr.
Schultz. However, shifting to a biennial budget will not in
itself change the perspective to a longer range view. This
is already the case in the current system. The PPBS
requires DOD to establish their budget on a multi-year
basis, extending projections out eight years. The
department currently has a long range perspective.
The advantage a biennial budget may provide is the
ability for the department, and consequently JCS, to
actually carry it out. Although projections for long range
requirements have always been considered, Congress has never
responded to this method of budgeting. They have
70
consistently considered the budget on an annual basis.
Legislating that Congress budget the DOD biennially, may
force them out of the annual perspective. Old habits are
hard to break, and Congress may be harder to change than
most organizations. As mentioned, above, however, the
benefits and the drawbacks of the biennial budget will not
be known unless the system is actually implemented.
The advantages of restricting the authorizations and
appropriations committees to their specific tasks may be
more readily obvious. The uncertainties about the budget
without the confusion of dealing with several committees and
subcommittees are large enough. The old notion that too
many cooks spoil the soup applies very well here. The
specialization of committees to deal with issues they should
be expert in can significantly improve the ability of DOD to
deal with Congress.
The Joint Chiefs effectiveness in communicating with the
right committee on the right issue can only be enhanced.
Knowledge of where the power centers are is crucial in
dealing with Congress. At present, the power centers are
unclear. Any one of several could influence the budget
outcome in an unperceived way.
The two issues go together very well. Both deal
specifically with Congressional side of budgeting. Their
common interaction could enhance JCS influence in the budget
process in the ways that are the primary aim of each
proposal. Affording the JCS the opportunity to carry out
their budget process with long-term implementation, mirrors
the method by which the budget within DOD is currently put
together. This would enable the Joint Chiefs to concentrate
their efforts consistently whether they are dealing with
Congress, the administration, or DOD. Clearly segregating
the tasks of the congressional committees JCS must deal
with, improves their ability to deal with those who
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ultimately approve the defense programs they will attempt to
gain.
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VI. FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
A. OVERVIEW
The last set of reforms, recommended by the CSIS study-
deal with Force Development and Acquisition. Some of the
recommendations which impact this area have been mentioned
in earlier chapters. These will not be reevaluated in this
chapter. These proposals are:
1. Broaden the responsibilities of the under secretary of
defense for policy;
2. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, along with the Joint
Staff should prepare force planning recommendations
constrained by realistic estimates of resources
available
;
3. Shifting DOD to a biennial budget.
The proposals concerning force development and
acquisition all deal with improvements in the way DOD
conducts business from a "money-efficiency" standpoint.
They deal with the details of accounting for the use of
resources, to establishing incentives through competition
for contractors of defense equipments.
None of these proposals is particularly controversial in
itself (with the possible exception of adding the aspect of
accrual accounting to our present accounting system, as well
as merging the programming and budgeting phases of PPBS).
The rationale behind these proposals will be explained
briefly, but a rigorous debate regarding the propriety or
impropriety of the proposal will not be conducted. The
proposals are uncontroversial partially because there is
little debate that the majority of them would infact result
in some level of enhancement in the DOD budget process.
Additionally, some of these proposals are new, and have not
yet had the advantage of academic debate.
73
The CSIS group states their initial premise for concern
for force development and acquisition as follows:
"The Department of Defense has developed two major
processes to aid the secretary of defense in integrating
the plans, programs, and budgets of the individual
military departments: the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) and the major system acquisition
process. Both processes need to be adjusted in line
with the organizational changes recommended in the
previous three sections to ensure that the secretary can
carry out his integrative roles effectively."
B. PROPOSAL 1: MERGING PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING IN PPBS
The first set of proposals in the area of force
development and acquisition are stated as follows: The
programming and budgeting phases of the PPBS should be
merged into a single process that retains a program and
mission orientation, but simultaneously establishes relevant
budget inputs. We recommend the integration of the
programming and budgeting processes in order to promote the
matching of resource inputs to program outputs and the
linking of both to defense objectives and missions. Under
this proposal, the programming and budgeting functions would
be merged at each stage of the process:
1. The issuance of policy and fiscal guidance by the
secretary of defense;
2. The preparation of program and budget requests by the
military departments and the operational commands;
3. The review of those requests by OSD.
1. What PPBS Is
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) has been discussed throughout this paper. What PPBS
really is, however, may not be clear. With this section of
the chapter concentrating specifically on PPBS, it is
important for the reader to know exactly what PPBS is, and
how it is currently working, in order to understand the
reasons for proposed reform. That is the purpose of this
section. The discussion will start with an overview of
PPBS, emphasizing the role of the Joint Chiefs.
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The Planning, Programming and Budgeting system, as
stated by Vincent Puritano and Lawrence Korb,
"is the key management mechanism by which the secretary
can exercise his statutory control over, and make
trade-offs among, the capabilities of the three military
departments and the 10 defense agencies that constitute
his vast domain. Thus, it is not at all surprising that
secretaries of defense have paid a great deal of
attention to the format as well as the substance of the
defense budget process. The format determines not only
who will make the decisions, but also how they will be
large degree, what decisionsmade, and therefore, to a
will be made." [Ref. 108: p. 570]
In short, PPBS "is the long-term process whereby mission
needs are identified, matched with resource requirements,
reviewed, and finally translated into budget proposals."
[Ref. 109: p. 571]
Through this system, the following decisions are
made
:
1. The size of U.S. forces;
2. The rate of modernization of forces and defense
assets
;
3. The level of readiness of U.S. operational forces;
4. The Quality of military life. [Ref. 110: p. 44]
This system has the major impact, along with the
equipment acquisition decision system (DSARC) in determining
U.S. military posture. The failure of this system would
have far reaching effects on our military capability.
[Ref. Ill: p. 44]
The Planning phase concentrates on determining the
threat to U.S. forces based on intelligence estimates.
These estimates form the basis for what will be required in
order to prepare the armed forces to counter the threat.
The Joint Chiefs combine the requirements from the unified
and specified commanders to meet the threat, and develop the
"minimum risk force" which is unprioritized. [Ref. 112: p.
7] This minimum risk force is developed without fiscal
constraint. It becomes the basis for the "planning force".
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The Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD)
prioritizes the missions of the minimum risk force which
then becomes the planning force. The JSPD utilizes this
planning force by sequencing it to carry out the military
strategy at an increased level of risk, but with a
reasonable assurance of success. The JSPD is then utilized
to influence the development of the Defense Guidance.
[Ref. 113: p. 7]
The Programming phase focusses on the Services. The
Services utilize the Defense Guidance to translate policy
statements by SECDEF into actual programs that require
funding. These funding requirements are forwarded to OSD
through the Program Objective Memorandum or POM. The POM is
a document which specifies the fiscal requirements for the
funding of required programs over a five year period, hence
the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).
The POM addresses service requirements in the areas
of forces, manpower, equipment and logistic support to meet
the policy requirements established in the DG . The Joint
Chiefs receive a copy of the various POMs , and comment on
their ability to meet the national military strategy,
through the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM)
.
[Ref. 114: p. 7]
The last phase, the Budgeting phase, commences with
the DOD components submitting detailed budget estimates to
OSD. In this phase, the Services are submitting these
estimates based on the approved programs, as well as budget
guidance provided earlier, and any revised guidance issued
during the year. The complete budget is reviewed for
accuracy in pricing, production schedules and consistency
with OSD's readiness objectives. The budget is reviewed
jointly by OSD and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). The final draft of the budget is then presented to
the President for approval. [Ref. 115: p. 5]
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2. Merging Programming and Budgeting
The preceding section identified what PPBS is, and
essentially how it works. The CSIS study established the
following reasons for changing this system by merging the
two phases of programming and budgeting:
1. The two phases have evolved into competing rather than
complementary processes
;
2. The budgeting phase has evolved into a separate
decision-making process as opposed to its intended
purpose of being limited to strictly costing out the
first year of the approved program;
3. The budgeting phase now reconsiders issues decided in
the programming phase;
4. The lack of a sufficient crosswalk creates difficulty
for decision-makers to evaluate implications of budget
cuts ;
5. Programs are developed on the basis of. outputs rather
than inputs. Budgets are developed in terms of
resource inputs. The FYDP , intended as a bridge
between the two is not a strong enough or responsive
enough crosswalk 22
These problems are exacerbated by the problem of assumed
fiscal guidance, and what the President is willing to
submit, and what the Congress approves. The wide
differences between these groups makes it impossible to
adequately program in advance.
These arguments are significant, and bear further
comment. The allegation has been made that the DG is a
primary source of the DOD's inability to adequately plan
fiscal requirements. [Ref. 116: p. 47] The DG is the
document SECDEF utilizes to direct the Services on the
structure of the FYDP. The DG , however misleads the
military leaders by over-optimism in the projected size of
the defense budget. Without fiscal realism, programming
becomes an exercise in futility. The DG is put together in
committee format, making it susceptible to the same types of
A crosswalk is a means by which dollars in one phase
in the budget can be translated "across" to equivalent
dollars in another phase of the budget cycle.
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criticisms as were found with the Joint Chiefs. All
programs will be justified due to fear of retaliation if
opposition to another's program is expressed. [Ref. 117: p.
48]
The lack of fiscal reality within the DG (the
beginning of the programming process) makes the programming
function essentially useless. Quoting Mark F. Cancian, in
his article PPBS: Rude Awakening
,
"One Navy programmer expressed the opinion that the only
part of the DG he heeded was the fiscal guidance- the one
?age which allocated funding for the five-year period,
he rest of the DG , being unexecutable and
uncoordinated, he ignored." [Ref. 118: p. 48]
In the eyes of the user, the remaining rhetoric of the DG
serves little purpose if the Services are restricted to, and
charged with targeting those levels specified on the fiscal
guidance page.
Other technical problems encountered in the
programming phase include:
1. The levels of future funds promised to DOD are
unrealistically high: all Presidents want to fully
fund the defense or the Country, but each year there
is a funding crisis which significantly cuts into the
level expected by our military leaders in the
programming stage;
2. Costs are never the same as they are forecasted:
predicting the costs of programs which are currently
not in existence is almost futile, in the face of a
multitude of variables which could potentially effect
that program through out its development;
3. Inflation figures are often projected as initially
high, but tapering-off over time: the anti- inflation
programs which each administration implements are
notoriously over-optimistic by assuming reductions in
inflation based on the success of their anti- inflation
?rogram. This creates a built-in cost increase when
he anti- inflation program proves to be less
successful than predicted;
4. As a program approaches its year of execution,
continuous adjustments are made: as funding becomes
less and less available the closer a project reaches
its start or execution date, the program experiences
treater and greater reductions in approved funding,
ccurate programming becomes impossible. Those in
positions of leadership continue to optimistically
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predict the availability of funds in the future,
delaying, or negating hard decisions such as
cancellation of now unaffordable programs. [Ref. 119:
pp. 48-51]
A further example of the the instability of the
program cycle is highlighted in the FY82 budget programming
phase. There were 160 priority changes in the budget phase
of FY82 for decisions already made in the programming cycle.
"In the Navy shipbuilding program, which by its nature
should be long-term and stable, major initiatives were
alternatively inserted and later dropped out as the
cycle progressed. Over the many months required to
reach a decision, all of the reviews and analyses by the
various technical and contract offices were redone
repeatedly." [Ref. 120: p. 572]
As mentioned previously, the Joint Chiefs review the
POMs submitted by the Services to assess the risk in
implementing these programs. Due to the timing of this
review, along with the exclusion of the Joint Chiefs in the
programming cycle, the views of the Joint Chiefs are seldom
incorporated in the issue papers submitted for review by
OSD. 23 [Ref. 121: p. 572]
The budgeting phase suffers from many of the same
problems as the programming phase. The "tail-end
perturbations" experienced just prior to presentation of the
President's budget to Congress cause significant frustration
to the process. They are created from changes in the
President's decisions on funding levels or revised inflation
forecasts, or both. With new decisions (equivalent to new
policy) DOD is faced with incorporating these changes into
the proposed budget. This cannot be accomplished without
disrupting the programs which have been developed over a
period of many months. The result is
2 The OSD central staff prepares these issue papers for
analysis of the POMs to determine their conformity to the
guidance established in the DG
.
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a crash series of meetings culminating in conflicting
guidance and unbalanced resource allocation for some
program areas ... a persistent 'ripple effect' on
program justification to Congress, reorientation of
policy, and implementation of budget decisions."
[Ref. 122: p. 572]
The problems of the budget phase are not just
similar to the problems of the programming phase. Likewise,
the problems of the programming phase are not just similar
to the problems of the budgeting phase. Infact , they impact
significantly upon each other. The two sets of problems are
literally tied together, creating a Catch-22. Because of
the massive requirements of the defense organization, it
would be virtually impossible to reduce the size of the
defense budget without major changes and orientations in
current national policy. This in effect means that the
defense budget will either remain at its current level, or
increase by virtue of inflation over time.
As long as national military objectives remain the
same, the need for a massive defense budget will exist. As
long as the wide spectrum of national military objectives
remains the same, the military establishment will program
for it. As those programs are submitted, the President will
continue to face the problem of deficit reduction in all
areas of the budget including defense.
This dilemma will inevitably result in the cutting
of programs prior to submission of the President's budget,
causing a revamping of the program decisions already made.
As long as the two phases are dealt with separately, they
are destined to experience the same problems they have been
experiencing for a very long time.
C. PROPOSAL 2: EVALUATION OF CURRENT AND FUTURE PROGRAMS
The CSIS study states its proposal for enhancing the
evaluation aspects of DOD budgeting as follows:
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"The Department of Defense should implement an explicit
evaluation process that systematically reviews progress
made in implementing programs and cycles that
information into subsequent planning, programming , and
budgeting phases. In effect, this evaluation system
would constitute a fourth phase of PPBS, completing the
allocation cycle by linking objectives to performance
standards .
"
Specifically, the CSIS study recommends three measures:
1. Conducting programming, budgeting, and execution
processes within a unified accounting structure;
2. Supplementing the current obligation-based accounting
system with reporting on an accrual basis;
3. Improving management information systems to enable
decision makers to evaluate progress toward identified
obj ectives
.
1. Accrual Accounting as a Unified Accounting Structure
The CSIS study developes their justification for a
unified accounting structure and the addition of accrual
accounting, along parallel lines. They will be discussed as
one issue here. The CSIS study starts its reasoning for
these changes as follows:
"The value of merging programming and budgeting would be
enhanced by parallel improvements in the accounting
system. The new system should record the use or
resources in the same manner as they are planned,
programmed, and budgeted. In this way, the reported
status of current programs would provide valuable
performance and cost information for decisions in the
planning cycle for future years."
They continue their argument by stating that DOD
currently has literally reams of reports, data, and
financial information which is often inconsistent,
incomplete, and untimely. They feel the accounting base
itself is inadequate to support effective evaluation of this
data. They continue by saying:
"The Department of Defense should also update and
improve its accounting system to provide complete,
accurate, and timely cost information to decision
makers. The accounting system should record the use of
resources on an accrual, as well as an obligational
,
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basis. Accounting on an accrual basis (recording
resources as they are expended) is a key factor in
improving the evaluation system, in that it would
provide the basis for judging the impact of spending on
a program in terms of its outputs."
It should be noted at this point, that the Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel reviewed this area during their study
in 1970. Their findings are not supportive of the proposal
to shift to an accrual method. Infact , they recommend
against instituting accrual accounting within DOD. The
reasons for this recommendation are essentially three-fold:
1. The traditional accounting methods within DOD reflect
cash flow and commitments, and have sufficed for
management needs
;
2. Accrual accounting is more costly, and provides, with
few exceptions, little benefit in a non-business
organization;
3. Only commands such as the Military Airlift Command,
which operates on a working capital fund, allocating
costs for establishing rates or tariffs for services
should use an accrual method. [Ref. 123: p. 129]
Their specific finding reads as follows:
"Accrual accounting systems in the Department of Defense
should be confined to those Service activities which
operate under stock funds or industrial funds, and which
are required to establish service charges which reflect
total costs." [Ref. 124: p. 129]
The CSIS study, and others, point out why those
reasons mentioned above, may not be sufficient for rejecting
the proposal of accrual accounting. To start our evaluation
in this area, it is appropriate to first discuss what are
"accrual" and "obligational" methods of accounting.
Obligational accounting, the system currently in effect
within DOD, bases the recording of an economic event at the
time that resources are "obligated" for it. Stated
differently, this system records an expenditure when an
obligation takes place, rather than when an item is
consumed. [Ref. 125: p. 236] The major drawback of this
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system, is that DOD does not and cannot monitor the rate at
which resources are used up.
The accrual method of accounting, records costs when
items are "consumed". As an example, inventories are posted
when received, but not recorded as a cost until they are
used (issued). Under the obligation method, the cost would
be incurred when the inventory was purchased for later
receipt and storage in the warehouse. There is no accurate
method to measure how much of an item has been used in
operations until the warehouse bin reaches its reorder
point. The only known quantity is is how much was reordered
to stock the shelves, not the rate of consumption of an
item.
The accrual method makes possible the evaluation of
financial operations by knowing how much is being consumed
as it is issued. The obligation method can only tell what
was consumed at the end of the period (quarterly,
semiannually, annually).
An additional advantage to the accrual method, is
financial reports are comparable. This forms the basis for
analysis and evaluation of DOD costs over a period of time,
the very element absent from DOD ' s current obligational
method. [Ref. 126: p. 367]
In comparing current DOD accounting practices with
that of private industry, the difference between the two
systems (obligational versus accrual) becomes even more
apparent. Quoting Morris A. Copeland from his book Trends
in Government Financing
,
"The established accrual accounting practices of private
business draw a sharp line between capital expenditure
and the means of financing them, on the one hand, and
charges and credits to the income account, on the other.
These practices make for a clean-cut separation of the
capital from the annual budget. Through the balance
sheet business financial reports tie capital
requirements in the physical sense and capital
requirements in the financial sense together.
Government accounting practices are quite different; the
development of accrual conventions has not gone very
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far. Only a few general government units
(nonenterprise , and non- trust units; have anything
called a capital budget, and none of these maintains a
set of accrual accounts that provide a full-fledged
balance sheet. The accounting tie between the two types
of capital requirements is, for the most part, missing."
He continues by saying,
'
. . . . conceivably a wider application of business
like techniques in government fiscal procedures may
bring about a closer relation between government
physical and financial capital requirements . . . .
IRef. 127: p. 6]
The bottom line of the CSIS proposal, and the
previous discussion, is there is presently no way to
evaluate current DOD operations. There is first, no way to
compare one year (month, week, day) to the last. Second,
there is no link between the accounting for resources used,
and resources being planned for. Even at year end, there is
no way to establish what the usage for a particular item
was, except through separate count. The costs of operations
are distorted by the unknown of how much was used. It is
known how much was obligated, but obligations do not
indicate actual consumption. An agency could easily order
excessive amounts of materials, but hold them in inventory.
The obligation records these items as costs of operations,
when they were infact never utilized. An accrual method of
accounting would provide the means for accurate cost
assessment and evaluation of operations at any time during a
given year.
As an example, a fund holder pays a contractor for a
service. Particularly in the long-term case, there is no
way to evaluate if DOD is getting its money's worth from
that contractor. There is no way to monitor the use of
resources as they occur. In obligational accounting, the
money goes out, but it is unclear what DOD is getting in
return, until the end of the project. Under accrual
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accounting, the output can be partially measured, or at
least monitored as the inputs are utilized. Under accrual
accounting, the question can be asked: "Are we going where
we want to go?" If not, let's adjust and make it work
right. This information should be an integral part of the
PPB system. If things are going right, don't tinker with
them. If they are not, this can be detected, and the
situation can be corrected before too many resources are
committed to a project which will not result in a desired
output
.
2. Improving Management Information Systems
The proposal for improved Management Information
Systems (MIS) is stated as follows:
".
. . . The Department of Defense should adopt more
comprehensive management information systems in order to
assess performance in crucial areas such as equipment
maintenance and combat readiness."
The CSIS study does not detail the requirements for
such a proposal. Their opinion is that each system would
have to be tailored to the individual function which
utilized it. The inclusion of this recommendation is
intended to address the issue as one which needs attention.
The CSIS group views this area as too extensive for
evaluation in the study. However, they recognize the need
for improvements and considered its mention as worthwhile.
The installation of new and upgraded MIS
capabilities through out DOD has increased significantly
over the past several years. The opportunity for greatly
expanded use, however, is significant.
The Navy currently utilizes one of the most advanced
computer systems in the world in its meteorological tracking
and forecasting center in Monterey, California. 24 Not all
2
"This system is one of four in existence, and is the
most expensive and technologically advanced computer systems
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MIS installations are expensive, nor do they need to be
extremely sophisticated. The utilization of such a worthy
resource as computer technology should be expanded far
beyond its present level. The drafters of the CSIS study
feel that it is an area which is currently under-developed
within DOD, and one which can be of significant value in
enhancing the breadth of proposals for improving the DOD
organization.
D. PROPOSAL 3: DEVELOPMENT OF A CAPITAL INVESTMENT PLAN
The recommendation for a capital investment plan is as
follows
:
"The Department of Defense should develop an overall,
long-range capital investment plan to provide a sound
basis for force development and acquisition. In this
context, the department will require more accurate cost
projections for major weapon systems."
In the past, it has generally been accepted that a
capital investment plan is worthwhile when the objective is
to facilitate long-term planning. That is, if an
organization undertakes projects which will last for more
than a year, or even multiple years (3 or more), then an
investment plan to program capital resources into those
projects is beneficial. Greater effectiveness in the
allocation of resources can be achieved through planning out
fiscal requirements. Organizations which do not engage in
multiple year projects have a much lower need for a capital
investment plan.
Until the establishment of PPBS within DOD, budgeting in
the Services was essentially on an annual basis. Contracts
were established, and projects were undertaken which fell
into the multiple year categories, however, there was no
multiple year fiscal planning on the part of DOD. With the
in the world.
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advent of PPBS, the Services were forced to establish plans
which delineated requirements for five years into the
future. Resource requirements were identified and included
in the President's Budget annually.
Although the formal establishment of resource
requirements, tied to current or planned projects, was a
step in the right direction, there was no formal capital
investment plan to guide the conduct and funding of those
projects. It is this investment plan that the CSIS study
identifies as a significant drawback to the current DOD
operation.
This plan would not be a duplication of the Five Year
Defense Plan. The CSIS study states its reasoning as
follows
:
"Because major system development takes eight to twelve
years, this plan should be based on a 15-year assessment
of the nature and scope of the military threat. To be
useful, it should be constrained by a realistic estimate
of the resources likely to be available for
defense . . . Once the plan had been prepared, the
primary task would be to prepare an annual update that
would take into account shifts in the assessment of
threats posed to the nation, new technological
opportunities, and altered judgments of fiscal
constraints on future defense budgets . . . The
long-range investment plan would not be an extension of
the FYDP . It would be less detailed and would be used
by defense decision makers as a planning guide, not a
definitive decision document."
The CSIS group projects the usefulness of such a plan in
two ways
:
1. It would provide a road map to each major mission area
that linked national strategic objectives with major
acquisition programs;
2. It would highlight aggregate demand on the overall
resources DOD is likely to have available over the
next 15 years
.
Implicit in the implementation of this plan would be the
requirement for accurate cost estimates. This area is not
one which is as easily dealt with as the benefits for the
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capital investment plan itself. Cost estimates, as stated
in the CSIS study, are often distorted for several reasons.
To be able to obtain more accurate cost estimates for this
plan because it will look so far into the future may be
doubly difficult. However, the posession of an estimate, be
it accurate, or even somewhat distorted, is better than
having no idea of what future requirements will be.
E. PROPOSAL 4: INTERNAL CONTRACTS TO GUIDE DOD
The CSIS study proposes an adjunct to the capital
investment plan. In addition to the long-range investment
plan, they recommend two supporting measures to increase the
stability of programs:
1. Congress should review the defense budget request on a
biennial basis;
2. Military services should be required to establish
internal contracts that set cost, performance, and
schedule baselines for their weapon programs
,
including reserves that are commensurate with the
uncertainties entailed.
The first proposal, reviewing the budget biennially, has
already been evaluated, and will be discussed in the
conclusion section of this chapter.
One of the major criticisms of the present planning
process which we have already seen concerns the tendency of
OSD and Congress to reevaluate, and reconsider decisions
which had previously been made. The intent behind the
second proposal to establish internal contracts, is aimed at
limiting this tendency throughout DOD, specifically within
the services.
The major problems with the current system are stated in
the CSIS report as follows:
"The acquisition process suffers greatly from what one
observer has called its 'ubiquitous turbulence':
shifting funding levels, lengthening production
schedules, frequent personnel transfers, and rapidly
changing design specifications. Continual revisions in
a program divert management attention from the task at





motivation and morale . . .
The CSIS proposal attempts to negate these tendencies of
over-reevaluation, and create stability within acquisition
programs
.
This proposal utilizes a successful program invented by
the Air Force for its major weapons acquisition programs.
This program essentially works as a baselining technique.
As stated in the CSIS report, each Service would establish
an "internal contract" for each weapon system program.
These contracts would specify the desired performance
parameters as well as annual funding levels, quantities, and
requisite production schedules. Once these contracts were
established, they could not be altered without direct
approval by the Service Secretary as a result of an explicit
review.
The legality of the contract is not an area of concern.
The concern is discouragement of both the Service itself,
and OSD (specifically the research and engineering office)
from creating perturbations within the program by initiating
frequent design changes.
This is not to suggest that the program could not
potentially include design changes if warranted. Changes
could, infact , be made. They would require a significant
enough return, however, to require the attention of the
Service Secretary. Less significant changes would be
combined and included in the program only as the system
required development of a newer version.
The internal contracts would be extremely legal, at
least within the military establishment . Just as
Reimbursement for Services contracts presently bind user and
host facilities in the payment by the user to the host for
services rendered and consumed, these contracts would be
unalterable except by the Service Secretary. The requisite
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need for changing a contract would have to be greatly
increased before action would ever be taken. The Service
Secretary would presumably be willing to entertain only
those items of considerable importance, and impact to the
program. The problem of nickel and diming a program into
significant additional funding levels and extended
production schedules may be greatly reduced.
F. PROPOSAL 5: CREATION OF MARKET INCENTIVES TO REDUCE
COSTS
The last set of proposals in the CSIS study concern
various aspects of reducing costs through the creation of
market incentives, and is stated as follows: The Department
of Defense should seek to create market incentives to reduce
costs in the defense acquisition process. Specifically:
1. Promoting competition among defense contractors
throughout the life of a weapon program;
2. Allowing Contractors to increase profit margins when
costs fall;
3. Encouraging the services to reinvest cost savings
toward increased quantities or improved performance of
the same weapon system;
4. Enhancing career opportunities and training of
acquisition managers;
5. Establishing unit cost as a primary criterion in the
initial design of weapons;
1. Lifetime Contractor Competition for Weapons Programs
The present practice within DOD for contracting
weapons systems is to take bids from several different
contractors, and award the contract to the lowest bidder.
At this point, there is, in general, no further pursuit of a
more cost-effective producer of the product . Essentially,
when a contract is let, it stays with the contractor until
the contract is completed. In many instances, even after
the initial contract, follow-on requirements, such as
increased quantities of a missile, or a tank, or a ship,
etc., remain with the original contractor.
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A new approach for DOD is the establishment of a
program where a contract would not remain with the original
contractor if another contractor could offer a bid below the
present contract.
As stated by the CSIS study,
"In the commercial world, the maintenance of some form
of alternative-either between two suppliers for the same
?roduct or between two products for the same mission-is
he norm . . . competition throughout the development
and production phases of a weapon program would provide
incentives for lower costs and greater performance. It
would also reduce the opportunities for contractors to
buy in" to a sole-source contract with an
optimistically low bid."
The main point here, is that competition throughout
a program's life will maintain pressure on the original
contractor to meet its original cost estimates. With the
potential for second and third parties to takeover a
contract through a lower bid, the potential for increasing
costs on the part of the contractor will be significantly
reduced.
2. Increased Profits From Cost Savings
Current practice within DOD is to recoup any savings
a contractor experiences back to DOD. Few incentives have
been available to contractors in the past for cost savings.
In private industry, the individual firm raises and lowers
its profit margin, sometimes daily, by the increase or
decrease it experiences in its cost of production,
marketing, sales, etc. These are factors of competition and
production which are not working in the defense contracting
industry. When a firm achieves a reduction in manufacturing
costs, either through more efficient processes, or greater
skill in purchasing raw materials, or better marketing at
lower costs, the firm rewards itself for these efficiencies
through increased profits. Assuming selling price and
volume stay the same, profits must go up if costs are
reduced.
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The incentive to work better and smarter is being
withdrawn from defense contractors. In this industry, once
a contract is made, sales volume is essentially fixed
(assuming no adjustments to the contract). Price is
supposedly fixed. The profit a contractor receives is
established by the previous year's contract plus some profit
margin. If costs increased in the previous year, the same
profit is still realized on the next contract. No incentive
is given for improved efficiency.
Private industry is motivated through the lure of
increased profits. There are several ways to achieve
greater profits. The two most elementary ways to increase
the selling price (if the market will bear it) or cut costs.
The coupling of the previous proposal for continuous
competition (which motivates industry to keep prices down)
and allowing the increase of profits from cost savings, a
downward pressure on the cost to DOD for weapon procurement
will be created. Industry will not be able to rely on a
given level of profit. However, profits could be increased
through more efficient production.
The CSIS study recognizes that the incentive to
achieve cost savings must be supported by the inverse
prevention of cost overruns. The study states,
"The Department of Defense should adjust the future
profit margins of defense contractors to reward cost
underruns and punish cost overruns. We propose that the
negotiated profit margin be adjusted up or down based
upon the contractor's prior-year performance in meeting
the planned unit costs for its product. If costs exceed
those specified in the contract, the profit margin on
the next contract would be reduced. Conversely, if
costs fall below those in the planned budget, the profit
margin would be increased. In this way, both the
government and the supplier would benefit from lower
costs . "
3 . Reinvestment of Cost Savings
As was stated earlier, the current practice for
dealing with cost savings is for the Service involved to
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return the money saved to DOD in the form of cost savings to
the government. Another alternative, which could compliment
the proposal for allowing increased profits, is to utilize
cost savings in the procurement of larger numbers of the
same item, or in improvements in the item.
The current system essentially encourages the
Services to keep costs at the negotiated price. Although
there are undesirable effects of cost overruns, there are
presently undesirable effects from cost underruns . When the
Services experience a cost saving, the approach taken by
Congress is to ask the question, "What is wrong with your
budgeting process? Why can't DOD accurately predict how
much a program will cost?" This obviously creates another
"Catch-22" situation with which the Services must deal. If
DOD comes in under budget, it is criticized. If it comes in
over budget, it is criticized.
The Congress generally responds by decreasing the
budget in the next fiscal year by the amount saved. As
stated in the CSIS report,
"The military services have little incentive to reduce
unit costs. Because the number of systems to be
procured is usually fixed, any savings from reductions
in unit costs usually end up as budget cuts in the next
fiscal year."
The attitudes are not focused on the aspect of rewarding DOD
for coming in under budget, but chastizing them for being
fiscally irresponsible in planning, and punishment by
erroneously lowering funding levels in the coming year.
The major focus for reform should also include a
reorientation of thinking on the part of Congress (and DOD
personnel) to view cost savings as positive rather than
negative. Congress must realize that DOD has a requirement
for the protection of public funds just as does Congress. A
lack of cooperative effort and a feeling of distrust on the
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part of Congress exacerbates rather than improves the
situation.
4. Enhanced Career Opportunities for Acquisition
Managers
One of the areas which professional military-
officers tend to vigorously shy away from is the area of
military procurement. This is not surprising in view of the
fact that unless an individual is in a "supply" career path,
he generally does not know the details of the procurement
business, and it is not a "career- enhancing" job for him.
As stated by the CSIS study,
".
. . . the military personnel system does not provide
adequate incentives for officers to seek assignments in
acquisition management. Most military officers
recognize that there are limited opportunities for
enhancing their careers in the acquisition world.
Accordingly, many seek to avoid such duty and those who
do serve in acquisition management positions seldom seek
further assignments. The result is that the overall
experience levels and training of uniformed personnel in
acquisition is inadequate."
One of the recent developments in this area is in
the Navy's "Material Professional" program. This is a new
program created by Secretary of the Navy Lehman with the
purpose of bolstering this area of concern. The intent of
the program is to select "front -running" individuals for
indoctrination into this program, creating a cadre of future
leaders who have "hands-on" experience in the acquisition
world. These individuals will form the basis for an
eventual one third of the Navy's officer corps which will be
material professionals. The area of military procurement is
so broad, that Secretary Lehman foresees the need for an
extremely large percentage of the Navy's officer corps to be
involved in the acquisition business.
This program will not only create a more sensitive
population within the Navy to the problems and
responsibilities of procurement, but it will provide a
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professional group of "home-grown" specialists to deal with
these issues. This program reflects the Navy's recognition
of the importance .of this area presently, but more
significantly, the vast growth in this area in the future.
5 . Unit Cost as a Primary Criterion for Weapons Design
Recent statements throughout the media (newspapers,
magazines, television programs) assert that there is little
concern for the cost of programs within DOD. Many feel that
this is not just an allegation, but a reality. As stated in
the CSIS study,
".
. . . cost is rarely a primary criterion in the
design of weapons: it is derived instead from
performance criteria. The normal Department of Defense
procedure is to optimize weapon designs for maximum
performance with limited attention to unit cost. The
department then seeks industry bids on those
specifications, awarding the contract to the lowest
responsible bidder. This practice discourages employing
advanced technology to lower costs. It also makes it
difficult to determine systematically the marginal costs
of specific improvements in performance, thus
complicating assessments of the tradeoffs between fewer
highly capable weapons and a greater number of somewhat
less capable weapons."
The CSIS study contends taking advantage of
advancements in technology will in itself reduce costs in
addition to maximizing performance. Unit cost is the key to
this assertion. The report continues by saying,
"Contractors would be required to meet these cost
limitations (limitations imposed by unit cost criteria),just as they are expected to meet specified performance
parameters. Indeed, the inclusion of cost as a primary
design parameter would promote explicit tradeoffs
between improved performance and lower unit costs with
larger numbers deployed."
The times of not being concerned about costs of
weapons systems have long been a thing of the past. Even
with the recent upsurge of funding with the takeover by the
Reagan administration, the cost of items procured has been
significantly scrutinized, if not by DOD, by Congress, and
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the administration. The increased source of funding in this
administration does not reflect an insensitivity to costs,
but rather a commitment to modernize a military force which
was inferior to the Soviet Union in many areas. Thus,
increased defense spending was a reflection of the necessity
to bring U.S. military strength up to speed. The cost of
getting the military establishment where it needed to be,
abreast of Soviet expansion, has been evaluated in depth all
along the way.
The present relaxation of congressional support of
increased defense spending makes clear the need to continue
to evaluate all dollars spent. The employment of unit cost
as a criterion for system selection, given the desired
characteristics of the system are met, is worthy, and
reflects efficiency in defense fiscal resources.
G. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has focussed on the following major areas,
some of which have been established as problem areas in
previous chapters:
1. Accuracy of policy guidance, and the development of
that guidance;
2. Making the budget process more efficient;
3. Establishing worthwhile evaluation processes;
4. Utilizing present technology to enhance management
functions
;
5. Acknowledging future long-range requirements now;
6. Preventing management practices which produce
inflationary results through frequent modification of
contracts
7. Reducing costs through free competition market
incentives
.
In many ways, this chapter is an eclectic composition.
It is not intended to be a catch-all. It does address
several areas of concern which fall under the force
development and acquisition category. All of these
proposals are of concern to the Joint Chiefs. They all
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effect, in some way, the effectiveness of JCS in its
political arena. Although it could be considered "reaching"
to say these are military problems, therefore, the Joint
Chiefs are effected by them, it is also a fairly accurate
statement. Its significance is probably greater than most
would admit
.
The JCS is concerned, first, and foremost, with the
effectiveness of the military forces. Their outfiting,
training, and efficient employment all reflect the results
of the Joint Chiefs' abilities to identify threats and
influence the fiscal resources appropriated to the military
establishment in order for the Services to adequately
prepare for combat. The Joint Chiefs also realize that the
reality of being effective in that role, is to be prepared
for the political arena which will ultimately decide the
level of funding the military receives.
As in all organizations, perceptions are one of the
major ingredients in how an organization is viewed by other
organizations. The perceptions of Congress, the
administration, and even OSD all impact the approach these
organizations will take in dealing with the issues of
funding the Services. Whether the media reports of cost
overruns, financial inefficiency, material readiness, etc.
are true or not, they are received by Congress and the
administration, and even in small ways, shape the
perceptions of the military establishments in these
organizations. The JCS organization must be prepared with
the greatest ammunition possible to both establish and
retain credibility in its political environment.
Again, to state the situation in elementary terms, the
best defense is a good offense. The offense may presently
be unsupportive of winning the game. Some may even question
which offense is the most important to concentrate on. It
can be stated, with some amount of certainty, that the Joint
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Chiefs need several offenses. One of these is the adequacy
of the fiscal resource processes within DOD. If the
supporting processes are inadequate to effectively support
the Joint Chiefs in their political environment, then the
process should be changed. Perhaps, the cost overruns, and
fiscal inefficiencies are in fact a result of poor
supporting systems. The Joint Chiefs cannot effectively
fight the political battle for more funds if the system they
are working with, in the eyes of the organizations granting
that funding, is wasteful, or incapable of utilizing those
funds efficiently.
The arguments presented here may not cure all of the
ills of the defense acquisition and development process, but
they may go a long way in creating the perception that the
Services are performing responsibly with the funds they are
given. By improving the system, particularly in terms of
getting the most for the money employed, the Joint Chiefs




VII. SPRAA: THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter does not deal specifically with a proposal
in the CSIS study. It will review the development of a new
organization within OJCS, not mentioned in the CSIS study or
in the academic literature. It is appropriate to dedicate
this chapter to this new organization because the
organization, and its concept, potentially hold the key to
resolving some of the influence problems associated with the
JCS organization. This chapter will discuss the
organization and intent of the Strategic Plans and Resource
Analysis Agency (SPRAA), and evaluate its present and future
role in supporting the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs and OJCS.
B. WHY SPRAA?
In May 1984, Congress directed JCS to develop within
itself an agency which could perform an evaluative role on
issues of interest. Specifically, the organizational
charter states,
"The Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency
(SPRAA) assists the Joint Chiefs of Staff in fulfilling
their statutory responsibilities to review the major
materiel and personnel requirements of the Armed Forces
in accordance with strategic and logistic plans. SPRAA
provides analyses and recommendations concerning the
impact of DoD program and budget proposals upon the
warfighting capability of the Armed Forces. SPRAA is
the OJCS focal point for resource implications in joint
planning issues considered by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff." [Ref. 128]
The primary reason behind SPRAA' s development rests in
the previous lack of evaluative capability within the JCS
organization. Prior to SPRAA' s development, OJCS did not
have the capability, in office support, hardware, or
manpower to provide an evaluation function. Various
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sections within OJCS performed limited independent
evaluations of issues. In general, however, evaluations
were left to the various Planning Analysis and Evaluation
(PA & E) groups within the military service departments.
The Joint Chiefs, and specifically the Chairman, did not
have the benefit of an independent agency which could
perform program or issue analyses. The SPRAA organization
was created to fill this void.
Questions may still remain concerning the need for the
organization. Why do the Chairman and OJCS need an
independent evaluation and analysis agency? Why duplicate
the efforts currently performed by the Services? The answer
is simple. The JCS organization needs an unbiased
evaluation of proposals. Programs desired by the Services
will inevitably be presented by them in a positive light for
approval. Programs no longer desired by a Service will be
negatively presented. The Joint Chiefs need a second
opinion developed by an independent body, not tied to the
Service's interests. Without an organization such as SPRAA,
that independent analysis is not available.
C. HOW SPRAA IS MANNED AND ORGANIZED
The SPRAA organization is headed by the Director, a two
star billet. He is assisted by an Executive Officer
(normally an 0-5), and the heads of the various functional
areas (normally 0-6 's). SPRAA is presently manned with
twenty-eight officers and fourteen civilians (a total of
forty-two). There are four additional civilian billets
authorized, but currently unfilled. This manning level will
probably remain constant for the immediate future.
The SPRAA organization supports the Director-OJCS . By
line diagram, they do not work directly for the Chairman,




The SPRAA organization is currently made up of three
major divisions (Force Programs and Manpower Analysis,
Program and Budget Analysis, and Weapons /Support Systems
Analysis), and two support offices (Concepts and Doctrine,
and Data Automation). Briefly, the missions of these
separate functional areas are as follows:
1. Force Programs and Manpower Analysis Division:
responsible for force structure and manpower
requirement analyses and other warfighting assessment
studies. Specifically, they will:
a) Coordinate the preparation of force and
manpower-related portions of the Joint Strategic
Planning System (JSPS) documents;
b) Direct analyses and studies of resource
allocations, readiness, sustainability
,
modernization and force structure;
c) Coordinate on specific issues of interest to the
JCS within manpower and force structure areas.
2. Program and Budget Analysis Division: responsible
for program/budget assessments and reviews as well as
congressional matters that impact resource
allocations. Specifically, they will:
a) Assist CJCS in DRB and Congress;
b) Assess PPBS issues and Program/Budget Review;
c) Coordinate the Joint Staff input to the SECDEF
Annual Report to Congress;
d) Serve as the Joint Staff focal point of contact
with CINC's, Military Services, and DOD for
resource allocation matters within the PPBS.
3. Weapons /Support Systems Analysis Division:
responsible for assessment of weapons and weapon
support. Specifically, they will:
a) Prepare CJCS representative for Defense System
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) milestone
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meeting except C3 systems and SECDEF update
briefing/performance reviews;
b) Prepare DJS for his participation as a member of
the Joint Requirements and Management Board
(JRMB)
;
c) Provide OJCS interface with the Defense Science
Board and coordinate Joint Staff review of the
USDRE Posture Statement.
4. Concepts and Doctrine: responsible for integrating
planning guidance and joint and combined doctrine
with programs and budgets, force structures, and
weapons and support systems. Specifically, they
will:
a) Maintain a reference for comparing Service
programs with plans, doctrine, and force guidance;
b) Maintain currency on developments by the OJCS of
joint and combined doctrine and strategic and
logistic plans for the Armed Forces;
c) Assist the Director, Joint Staff on special issues
which require integration within the OJCS.
[Ref. 129]
D. WHAT SPRAA CURRENTLY DOES
The SPRAA organization is essentially performing all of
the tasks stated above, as well as others. The areas of
interest involve not only evaluation of activities and
programs of the Services on specific issues, but SPRAA is
involved in, and has successfully contributed to the
evaluation of the operation of OJCS. As previously
discussed, the paper process for the routing of issue papers
by action officers was substantially changed through MOP 132
which was written by the SPRAA organization.
As can be seen, the function and intent of SPPJlA. can be
applied to internal review as well as other JCS interests.
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If the value of the product turned-out by SPRAA could be
measured by this one contribution alone, it can be fairly
stated that SPRAA will provide a worthwhile input to those
utilizing the organization as an evaluative resource.
In the budget area, SPRAA is currently performing a
major task (as stated above) in acting as a focal point for
the CINC's in their input to the budget process. Until very
recently, the CINC's had virtually no input or voice in this
area. There was no effective method by which the CINC's
could input the budget process. With respect to CINC
involvement in PPBS alone, SPRAA is currently providing the
following services:
1. Represent CINC's PPBS views to the Chairman, in his
capacity as the spokesman of the commanders of the
combat commands on operational requirements;
2. Provide single point of contact in OJCS for the
programming and budgeting phases;
3. Manage CINC's impact on the budget, the Defense
Guidance and the POM preparation;
4. Provide CINC's copies of the military department and
the defense agencies POM's and related material (issue
books, PDMs, PBDs , DOD portion of the President's
Budget);
5. Provide CINC's documents to assist in preparation for
Congressional testimony;
6. Provide assessment to JCS on CINC's problem areas;
7. Monitor treatment of CINC issues during the DRB
program review.
Through the SPRAA organization, the CINC's may now
transmit directly to JCS a prioritized list reflecting their
most pressing budget requirements. Item six in the list
above acts as a relief valve for the CINC's. When a CINC
feels he is not getting his message through to a particular
Service in the budget area, he now has an alternate method
by which he can get his concerns known.
The SPRAA organization now receives a "top ten" problem
list from each CINC. This list addresses the problem areas
where the CINC feels he must have more support than he is
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currently receiving. SPRAA then evaluates and prioritizes
these lists into a document the Chairman can utilize in the
DRB . SPRAA performs the role of the CINC representative to
the Chairman in this area. SPRAA evaluates the problem
areas and forwards that evaluation to the Chairman, thus
providing one more method by which the CINC can input the
budget process.
E. SPRAA' S FUTURE ROLE
There is probably no theoretical limit to which SPRAA
will be restricted in its future role. As the organization
grows and refines its capabilities, it will expand to the
extent that its leaders, and those above it utilize its
potential. Essentially, its future utilization is dependent
upon the vision and desires of the Chairman and the Director
of the Joint Staff. SPRAA' s director will be in the best
position to visualize the organization's potential, and
advise others as to its most effective and efficient
employment
.
From its own perspective, the SPRAA organization
envisions its missions expanding in the following areas:
1. Manage CINC ' s impact on the DG , the POM, and on budget
preparation;
2. Isolate DRB issues early for the Joint Chiefs;
3. Prepare the Chairman for the DRB program review;
4. Prepare the Chairman for Congressional testimony;
5. Identify resource impacts on war fighting capability;
6. Identify joint system candidates for management;
7
.
Provide support for the Joint Resources Management
Board ( JRMB7
.
8. Perform special actions as directed.
SPRAA additionally envisions itself performing further
evaluation and recommendation through the use of a
mathematical model (now under development) which will enable
it to provide optimal alternatives and recommend decisions
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on budget issues. 25 This model will essentially consider the
trade-offs involved in weapons systems for various budget
constraints. There is currently no mechanism available
which can provide this information. There is skepticism in
its application. Developing this model has been compared
with attempting to model the world. The model will
obviously require a great deal of evaluation to determine
its ability to predict accurately and produce viable
decisions. This model can potentially provide the Chairman
with analysis information he does not currently possess.
These future roles center around support of the
Chairman. Although they deal with all functional areas of
JCS operations, their central aim is that of supporting the
Chairman by preparing him with accurate evaluative
information he can utilize in working within his echelon of
interaction.
Another example of the type of support needed by the
Chairman concerns the evaluation of the current readiness of
the armed forces. The Chairman presently relies on the
information contained in the Unit Readiness and
Identification Report (UNITREP System) to indicate the
capabilities of our defense forces. The Chairman has no
other method of evaluation available to him. The major
drawback of this system is its inability to communicate to
the reader the " capability " (increase/decrease or no change)
resulting from resource allocation issues, even though this
is what it is being utilized for. Congress has utilized the
UNITREP system to demonstrate how the military is
mis -spending its funds.
During the Reagan administration's military build up,
the capabilities of the armed forces have expanded
significantly. At the same time, however, readiness has not
25 SPRAA is one of many organizations working on this
type of model
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significantly changed. 26 The armed forces will only retain
an average level of readiness on a day to day basis.
Capability, however, will change as funds are utilized to
purchase new systems. Infact , capability has expanded
considerably in recent years.
Congress suffers from a distorted opinion that as money
is pumped into the defense establishment, readiness will
increase. This is not necessarily true. Maintaining high
levels of readiness depends on no delays in parts delivery,
no personnel sickness or death, and no delay in getting
required training for all personnel. All of these are
impossibilities which cannot be controlled regardless of the
amount of money poured into defense. And yet, it is by this
measurement that the military is being judged in evaluating
its effectiveness and efficiency in resource allocation.
Congress perceives DOD as out of control. The
allegation is that DOD is wasting money if readiness is not
going up, particularly in view of the large amount of money
having been allocated to DOD in recent years. Lack of
increased readiness results in JCS and the Services being
perceived as poor managers. If they can't do it right with
the money they have already been given, why should they be
given more?
It is this type of misunderstanding that the Chairman is
in the best position to deal with. By the end of calender
1985, SPRAA expects to be able to provide the Chairman with
worthwhile information which equates resource allocation
with changes in capability. SPRAA' s evaluation of resource
commitment as an input, and capability as an output, will
2S This is not completely true. Readiness has increased
due to the massive expansion in repair parts availability
alone. However, readiness levels fluctuate as systems fail
through use, and are repaired and brought back on line.
Readiness goes up and down on a daily basis specifically
because systems rail through use, and must be repaired.
Capability only expands or reduces through the addition or
deletion of whole systems, not components of those systems.
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provide the Chairman an accurate picture of efficiency and
effectiveness in this area.
This one factor, by itself, can significantly enhance
JCS influence over the budget process. It can significantly
increase the credibility of JCS within the political arena.
The Joint Chiefs are in great need of increased trust and
credibility on the part of Congress, SECDEF and all of the
organizations which desire straight forward well-analyzed
and fully considered military advice. The role of the SPRAA
organization will be crucial in this process; more
emphatically, it will probably not be possible without them.
SPRAA can make great strides for the Chairman and the
military establishment by providing an evaluative process
resulting in accurate information for the Chairman to
utilize. SPRAA can play a key role in enhancing the
military's, and hence, the Joint Chiefs' credibility in the
political arena.
F. THE BIG QUESTION
All of what has been said thus far concerning SPRAA
looks at its potential in assisting the Joint Chiefs,
specifically the Chairman, in independent analysis. The big
question is whether or not SPRAA will be given the continued
independence it requires to perform this task. It should be
clear that SPRAA has the potential for performing in the
ways already mentioned. The major drawback perceived is the
dependence on SPRAA for information.
SPRAA is not independent . It must depend on the
Services for information and data. SPRAA does not have a
cadre of individuals who can go out and collect data
independently for its use. It must, by design, depend on
the Services to provide it with information. If the
information provided by the Service is biased (the Service
will almost always know what the information will be used
for), then this in itself brings into question the
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independence and therefore the usefulness of any conclusion
SPRAA may reach.
The major hope for this perceived system perturbation
lies in the knowledge that the Action Officers within SPRAA
deal with Action Officers in the Service staffs on a daily
basis. The information source is established in each
briefing. If the information is provided by the Navy, it is
made clear at the beginning of the briefing that the Navy is
responsible for its accuracy. Hence any improper
conclusions which may be drawn from it, if it is skewed or
biased unfairly, is the responsibility of the Service
providing the data.
The problem of "jointness" and its threat of retaliation
(mentioned previously) in this instance works in favor of
the system by preventing one AO from providing biased
information to another. In the words of one AO , "If you
stick me in the back, it will only happen once." This may
appear petty, and not in keeping with professional
standards. It is, however, reality, and an effective check
on the system.
Through a combination of the revised paper work
procedure, and the adequacy of information provided by the
services, it would appear that SPRAA has a very great
potential for performing the roles established as an
independent organization. The test of time is always





This paper has dealt with a wide variety of issues
focusing on JCS influence on the budget process.
Specifically, it has discussed the major proposals of the
CSIS study published in February 1985. It has sought to
determine whether those proposals will enhance the influence
of the Joint Chiefs on budget issues.
One aspect of these issues is common. The recurring
theme of problems caused by all involved in the process (the
Chiefs themselves, their Services and Service staffs, and
the Joint Staff), is not being able to think in joint terms
and promoting protectionism. This appears to be at the heart
of the influence problem. The political aspect of
protecting one's own turf gets in the way of a more global
perspective. The global perspective is what is
solicited/desired specifically by those people who use the
information provided by JCS.
The primary question at issue, is should there be a
change in the current system. This begs the question of the
need for change: or given the types of problems in the
present system, would it be more productive to stick with
the current system, or institute changes where possible. A
review of the major problems identified within the JCS
system, and the solutions proposed by the CSIS study is
shown in Table 1.
The essential elements of the first seven problem areas
have been argued from both sides. From a purely academic
perspective, and from a realistic and practical standpoint,
these issues and recommendations for change presented by the
CSIS study appear workable and worth implementing. Although
there is debate on both sides, the logic involved as well as
the weight of the arguments favor the CSIS study.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF MAJOR JCS SYSTEM PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Problem




Chaiman prepare planning re-
commendations realistically
constrained by fiscal and
golicy guidance issued by
ECDEF. (Thesis p. 30)
2. Lack of control by CINC
over resource allocation
for operational forces;
Provide for greater CINC in-
volvement in budget matters.
(Thesis p. 33)
3. Lack of consistency in
policy guidance and Service
mission;
Align policy guidance from
OSD with the missions of the
Services. (Thesis p. 43)
4. Inconsistent direction
in areas of sustainability
and readiness;
Create a third under secre-
tary responsible for these
areas. (Thesis p. 49)
5. Micro-management of DOD
by the OSD staff;
Reduce the size of the OSD
staff. (Thesis p. 52)
6. Congressional committee
overlap with the budget
review process;
Establish a biennial budget,
and reestablish authority of
Congressional committees.
(Thesis p. 58)







8. Inability of JCS as a
body to provide worthwhile
information due to the
dual-hat conflict;




advice due to the committee
system;
Chairman provide SECDEF dis-
senting Service views on




In seeking to correct these problems, this paper is not
condemning the present system. Nor is it advocating that
the system is out of control or unworkable. Thirty plus
years of performance have proven the system does work.
However, thirty plus years of observation of that system
have additionally identified areas where the working system
can be made more efficient and effective.
The first seven problem areas are tangible or reachable
because they can be dealt with without stepping on too many
toes. Reducing the size of a staff here, adding an under
secretary there, changing the format of a policy document
are all changes well within the reach of those currently in
positions of authority within those organizations. This is
not to belittle these recommendations. They are
well-founded, and worthy of implementation. Additionally,
they will, without question, meet some opposition during
implementation and Congressional approval (where required).
However, they are attainable because they are "nibbling" at
the edges rather than dramatic changes in the total system.
It is possible to make these changes and make them without
significant debate involving the roots of the military
structure
.
The remaining two problem areas are of a different
nature. These last two problems strike at the heart of how
the military structure is designed. In proposing a change
in these areas, a plethora of logical, rational, irrational
and emotional debate is unleashed. They are unleashed from
all directions. To some, these questions are basic and need
to be addressed, and their problems corrected through
significant structural change. To others, the questions are
so absurd as to not warrant addressing.
The question of making the Chairman the single advisor
to his superiors as well as separating OJCS to work for the
Chairman alone, must be viewed from the perspective of what
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is mandated by law for the organization, and what would be
gained or lost by changing that law if it were decided to do
so. The JCS organization is directed to view issues from a
joint perspective. At present, all of the Chiefs feel they
have significant input into what is being presented as
advice to their JCS superiors. Under the current structure,
each has a vote, and each may voice his views, and most
importantly, will voice his views through the currently
established channels. The Chiefs are all presently forced
to think "jointly".
If the Chairman and the Joint Staff are separated, such
that there are clear lines of division between OJCS and the
Service Chiefs (i.e. full direction of OJCS coming from the
Chairman and the Chairman alone), the methodology of "joint"
thinking will be pushed farther away, as each Service Chief
withdraws into his own Service, becoming even more
protectionist. This paper is not suggesting that there is a
lack of protectionism in the present system. Infact , it
should be clear that present protectionist thinking is one
of the key problems in this debate. There is currently too
much of it. The problem suggested is that of creating the
potential for even greater protectionism and complete lack
(as opposed to a partial lack) of joint thinking. Creating
professional and emotional fissures between the Chairman and
the Service Chiefs will not assist in building a better
joint product, it can only make worse the present situation.
With respect to the budget process, and as has been
established in previous chapters, the Joint Chiefs, as a
body, lack credibility. They lack credibility because their
product tends to be a mushy product that all can agree on.
This is partly because of the committee system, and partly
because of conflicting loyalties between their roles as
Joint Chiefs and their roles as the leaders of their
respective services. They lack credibility in Congress
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because the Chairman is ill-prepared to defend the
activities of the military with solid accurate data. He is




The need to strengthen the Chairman is obvious. By
separating him even further from the Service Chiefs by
making him the single military advisor as well as separating
the Joint Staff, prevents at best, and perhaps destroys, any
form of joint thinking which may come from the Chiefs in
their current structure. As was seen earlier, some of the
major problems of the paper process were corrected not by
changing the JCS organization. They were corrected by
changing the paper process itself. SPRAA treated the cause
rather than the effect. This in itself may be a lesson in
dealing with the issue of the position of the Chairman. It
may be best to deal with the Chairman's position in its
current form, rather than changing the structure of the
organization.
The SPRAA organization is one method by which his
position may be strengthened, but without the expense of
negating joint thought, or reorganizing the military
structure. This is not to suggest that SPRAA is the
panacea. It obviously is not. It is, however, one more
significant step in improving the organization.
The revision of the paper shuffling process, and the
creation of an internal evaluative organization (SPRAA), are
two very positive examples of improving the organization's
present structure in-house without starting from scratch.
The Chairman's role, as currently structured is workable,
and can potentially be improved even further. It will
require continued analysis.
This is not a function currently given to the
Chairman. He is not presently charged under Title 10 to
independently assess the value or accuracy of data or issues
submitted by a Service.
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The proposals of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies present some (though not all) unique
and workable solutions. The combination of SPRAA and the
other recommendations mentioned above, gives the Joint
Chiefs' organization the greatest potential for increased
effectiveness and credibility, resulting in potentially
greatly enhancing JCS influence in the policy-making
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